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Household finance is a young and vibrant research field that continuously attracts public 
attention. There may be very few matters that the people care so much about as their personal 
finance. The recent rise of academic and policy interest in household finance is largely due 
to the rise in the market share of household assets and liabilities in the overall financial 
industry and households’ more active role in financial decisions. These decisions include, 
but are not limited to: 
1. choice of the financial markets to participate in, and if so, how much to invest in each of 
them, i.e., how to allocate the financial portfolio among these different assets; 
2. choice of the financial instruments to be used (such as insurance and loans); 
3. choice of the financial intermediaries (banks) and the dynamics of the household-bank 
relationship. 
In this thesis, I empirically investigate these topics and their interlinkages by micro-
econometric analysis of household-level survey data. 
In Chapter 1, I relate topics 1 and 2, by associating the households’ portfolio choice to a 
public health insurance design. Previous literature identified that health risk plays an 
important role in the household’s decision to invest in risky assets. Using a cross-country 
household survey of the elderly (the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe), I 
document the role of health care system generosity for the households’ portfolio choice and 
a complementary protection provided through a family care. Namely, I find that the portfolio 
composition is sensitive to both self-reported health status and to the bequest motives, but 
only in the countries that lack a full-coverage National Health System. The rationale is, that 
in these countries there is less financial protection against out-of-pocket medical 





exposure elsewhere e.g., shying away from stocks. Furthermore, the people can use the 
bequest to bargain care from their children by promising them inheritance, which may 
encourage the stockholding. The empirical findings in chapter 1 support both claims. 
In Chapter 2, I investigate topic 3 using the Italian household panel survey provided by 
the Bank of Italy (the Survey of Household Income and Wealth). Specifically, I investigate 
the determinants of household’s decision to switch its bank in particularly focusing on the 
features of their relationship. From both banks’ and regulator’s perspective it is important to 
know what characteristics affect the ‘stability’ of a deposit. Despite this relevance, there is 
little research on the dynamics of household-bank relationship over time. Banks can affect 
the relative stability of their deposits through their relationship with the clients and by 
attracting more stable clients. The results in chapter 2 show that clients having a well-
embedded relationship with the bank, as measured by an exclusive relationship (i.e., using 
only one bank) and/or using more bank services, are less likely to switch their bank. I also 
document that this decision is strongly positively correlated with both taking out and paying 
off a mortgage. As for the household characteristics, I find that household size, marital status, 
education and financial literacy are associated with the decision to change bank, whereas 
mobility and the overall economic condition of the household are not. Some of the 
characteristics of the discarded bank also matter, with the cooperative banks being 
significantly less likely to be abandoned. 
In Chapter 3, using the same data source, I relate topics 2 and 3. I study the importance 
of the mortgage refinancing costs in retail banking. Switching costs can be an important 
distorter of competition in many markets, including banking, and have received significant 
attention in both academic and policy discussions. However, assessing the impact of these 
costs on client and bank behaviour imposes a challenge to devise a convincing identification 
strategy. I exploit an exogenous source of variation to switching costs in the mortgage market 
(commonly referred to as the “refinancing costs”) brought forward by a legal change in Italy 
known as the Bersani Law, which allows me to identify a causal effect of the reform to bank 
switching of the mortgage holders. Nevertheless, I find that the effect is present only for more 
educated individuals and less competitive markets, highlighting the defining role of 





behaviour of extant mortgage holders, I also document that the Bersani Law made “mortgage 
shopping” (switching a bank when taking out a mortgage) more widespread. The latter 
finding indicates that the newly increased flexibility in the mortgage market increased the 
bank competition for new clients and decreased the clients’ inertia. 
 
 















Previous literature identified that health risk plays an important role in household’s decision 
to invest in risky assets. This paper investigates whether association of health status with 
household’s portfolio riskiness varies across 11 European countries with varying generosity 
of health care systems. The data are drawn from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE) that surveys the elderly population. The results show that worse (self-
perceived) health status is associated with less risky portfolio holdings only in countries that 
lack a full-coverage National Health System. Furthermore, the informal care arrangements 
(in form of a strategic promise of inheritance) seem to be de facto complementary to the less 
generous publicly organized health care provision in these countries. This result indicates a 
spillover of health-related financial risks of the elderly to younger individuals, who are not 
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Based on the World Health Organization 2012 report covering 90% of the world’s 
population, an estimated 100 million people are pushed under the poverty line each year 
simply because they use the health services for which they are forced to pay out of their own 
pockets.1 Bankruptcy scenarios induced by the medical expenditures are present both in the 
poor and rich countries (Xu et al., 2003), and both for the poor and rich individuals 
(Himmelstein et al., 2005). In Europe, due to the population ageing, the health care 
expenditures became increasingly important over the last few decades.2 These developments 
raised a particular concern among the EU countries, which are bounded by the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty’s stringent spending rules. Hence, following the Treaty, and being faced 
with the rising health care costs, the EU countries introduced the restrictive fiscal policies 
which reduced the generosity of their health care systems. These reforms faced the patients 
with either rationing or an increase in the co-payments to access the publicly provided health 
care services, both increasing the unexpected out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure, thus the 
overall household’s financial risk. As the background risk theory suggests, this vulnerability 
may drive the households to adjust their exposure to other types of risks (Gollier and Pratt, 
1996 and Goldman and Maestas, forthcoming) such as a rate-of-return risk of their portfolio. 
The previous literature documented that the health status is associated with the 
portfolio riskiness, on both the extensive margin (willingness to hold a particular type of 
asset) and the intensive margin (share of financial wealth held in each asset category) of 
portfolio choice.3 However, a generous health insurance may mediate the risk of a medical 
expenditure, thus weakening the association of portfolio choice and health status. To 
empirically test this theoretical prediction, the cross-country analysis offers a natural source 
of variation in household’s (expected) health-related expenditures given the heterogeneity of 
the corresponding health care systems that shield from these expenditures to different extents. 
Our main hypothesis may be formalized as follows: ceteris paribus, poorer health increases 
                                                          
1 To simplify comparability across countries and over time, the poverty line has been standardized as a daily 
income of US$ 1 at the international standards. The World health statistics 2012 (page 40), available at: 
http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/EN_WHS2012_Full.pdf 
2 More details on the phenomenon of “population ageing” are available at: 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing. 
3 See e.g., Rosen and Wu (2004) and Edwards (2008). 
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the risk of out-of-pocket medical expenditures which drives the household away from other 
sources of risk, resulting in less risky portfolio holdings. However, the strength of this 
association is lower in the countries that have a highly protective publicly provided health 
care systems. Thus, in this paper, we test whether the lack of such a generous health care 
system increases the sensitivity of the household portfolio choice to its (self-perceived) health 
status. 
Using a rich dataset from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE), Atella et al. (2012) contribute to the literature by exploiting the heterogeneity of 
the health care systems in 10 European countries and focus on the association of health risk 
and household’s propensity to hold risky assets (extensive margin of portfolio choice). In line 
with the theoretical prediction, their results highlight the importance of the health care system 
in mediating households’ health risk through the medical expenditure channel. Further 
research is needed to investigate the role of the health care systems for the portfolio share 
allocated to those assets (intensive margin of portfolio choice) as a closer measure of the risk 
that a household chooses to bear. Additionally, from a methodological point of view, being 
a large household survey, the SHARE suffers from a high item non-response rate, which can 
substantially bias estimates and lead to a large efficiency loss, especially with many variables 
entering a regression equation. To fill in these gaps, our study employs the multiple 
imputation analysis of the SHARE data to investigate importance of the health care systems 
for the household portfolio choice on both extensive and intensive margins. After controlling 
for many potentially confounding factors, our results show that worse (self-reported) health 
status implies lower propensity to hold stocks and lower share allocated to them, but these 
associations are present only in countries that lack a full-coverage National Health System. 
The results further indicate that less generous publicly organized health care provision in 
these countries seems to be de facto complemented by the informal care arrangements 
through a family network. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews previous theoretical 
and empirical literature to understand the question of interest and delimit the variables to be 
used in the analysis; Section 3 discusses the methodological approach to the analysis; Section 
4 describes the data; Section 5 presents the empirical findings; Section 6 concludes. 
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1.2 Previous literature 
The traditional portfolio theory states that an investor's willingness to take financial 
risks depends only on her risk aversion and investment opportunities.4 This conjecture has a 
strong implication that although the households have highly heterogeneous characteristics, 
their portfolios should share a few common features: each household should invest at least 
some amount in stocks in order to profit from excess return they provide, all investors should 
hold the same portfolio of risky securities and these portfolios should be well diversified (all 
risky assets should be included). 
 Despite the uniformity predicted by the traditional theory, there is high heterogeneity 
in the investors’ observed behavior. Among the stockholders, there is a considerable 
heterogeneity of share of assets invested in stocks, with the overall distribution of portfolio 
allocation being highly positively skewed - many households have risky share equal to zero, 
thus opt out of the stock market entirely. This phenomenon, dubbed the “stockholding 
puzzle,” represents a partial equilibrium counterpart of the “equity premium puzzle”, and 
receives a great attention in the literature, posing a challenge to both portfolio choice and 
asset pricing theory (Bertraut and Haliassos, 1995). Another empirical finding is that the 
portfolios are usually weakly diversified. 
These empirical observations do not necessarily imply that any of the investors is 
making a mistake or that the revealed preference theory should be abandoned, if one 
considers that the indiviuals may have different preferences and face different circumstances 
(Curcuru et al., 2009). To account for this, the empirical literature aimed to single out 
variables that might help explain portfolio choice observed in the microeconomic data. The 
literature documents vast and systematic differences in portfolios of individuals with varying 
attributes (see Curcuru et al., 2009 for an excellent summary) such as their socio-economic 
characteristics (income and wealth), and demographic characteristics ranging from age 
(Guiso et al., 2002; Brunetti and Torricelli, 2010) to education (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002), 
cognitive abilities (Christelis et al., 2010), gender and marital status (Bertocchi et al., 2011). 
                                                          
4 See Gollier (2002) for a good survey. 
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Therefore, unlike the traditional finance theories, the recent literature (including the 
background risk literature), allows for many factors other than the risk aversion and the 
investment opportunities to affect the portfolio choice. The background risk theory states 
that, under some regularity assumptions on preferences5 when faced with some unavoidable 
(or non-fully insurable) risk (dubbed “background risk”) individuals tend to reduce their 
exposure to avoidable ones (Kimball, 1993; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1987; Elmendorf and 
Kimball, 2000), such as investing in the risky assets.6 Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) show 
that an agent's willingness to bear other risks in presence of a background risk decreases 
whether or not the two risks are correlated. Thus, reducing (one part) of the background risk 
can increase investment in risky assets, even if the reduced risk is uncorrelated with that of 
the risky assets (Gollier and Pratt, 1996). 
There is a large literature analyzing labor income as a source of background risk (see 
e.g., Guiso and Paiella, 2008). The labor income uncertainty may be particularly important 
among the younger and middle-aged individuals, but for the older population the health risk 
might be even more important since the health status declines with age and many elderly are 
already retired (or close to the end of their working age). The health risk, as a source of 
background risk, entails both direct (i.e., the healthcare expenditure which increases the 
marginal utility of wealth by absorbing it) and indirect costs (i.e., the loss of labor income 
due to the reduced productivity) for the household. However, the insurance coverage 
decreases the risk of out-of-pocket medical expenditure, thus reducing the household’s 
overall background risk (Edwards, 2008; Yogo, 2009). 
Empirical literature widely acknowledges that the health risk is a significant 
determinant of household’s portfolio choice. Using the US Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS), Rosen and Wu (2004) find health risk to be significant in explaining both the stock 
participation and the portfolio allocation. Interestingly, they show that this negative 
association is not driven by the “third variables” that simultaneously affect the health and the 
financial decisions, such as the family background, the industry and the occupation and that 
it does not seem to operate through the effect of health status on individuals’ risk aversion, 
                                                          
5 More specifically, the property of continuously differentiable utility functions with derivatives that alternate 
in sign (e.g., Gollier and Pratt, 1996). 
6 Such “proper risk aversion” characterizes most of the commonly used utility functions. 
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the planning horizons or their health insurance status. Edwards (2008) presents a theoretical 
model of portfolio choice in which the current health status and expectations about the future 
medical expenditure burden determine portfolio shares, and using the HRS and the Survey 
on Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) he finds that the risky 
share is decreasing in both variables. Goldman and Maestas (forthcoming) document that 
among the Medicare beneficiaries who own different forms of supplementary health 
insurance and, thus, have different exposure to medical expenditure risk, those who face less 
of this risk are more likely to hold risky financial assets. 
Health is a risky asset itself, so the fundamental question is whether the individuals 
can adequately insure against it (Edwards, 2008). Health risk is insurable, but markets are 
imperfect, thus in analyzing the financial implications of health risk, type of the health care 
system in place may play a central role. The national full-protective insurance may be 
particularly important in shielding the households from the health-related financial risk. As 
Goldman and Maestas (forthcoming) emphasize “health risk and medical expenditure risk 
are closely related, but they are distinct sources of background risk.” Atella et al. (2012) add 
that “the former is a sole function of the actual health condition of household members, while 
the latter depends not only on health risk but also on health insurance coverage. In turn, 
health insurance coverage varies among countries due to different health care systems.”  
Guiso and Sodini (2012) emphasize that financial decisions and risk-taking by 
individuals is, indeed, likely to vary relative to the economic and institutional environment 
where decisions are being made. To this end, the cross-country (or cross-state) data is a 
natural source of variation. Recently, Mahoney (forthcoming) exploits the variation in the 
design of the bankruptcy laws across the US states to show that the bankruptcy provides the 
households with an implicit health insurance. This protection, in turn, affects their out-of-
pocket medical expenditure (conditional on the care provided) and their demand for the 
health insurance. Using the SHARE data and exploiting the heterogeneity of health care 
systems across Europe, Atella et al. (2012) study the medical expenditure channel of the 
effect of health status on the extensive margin of the households’ portfolio choice. They find 
evidence by probit analysis that it is only in the countries with less generous health systems 
that worse (self-reported) health status is associated with lower probability of holding risky 
assets. 
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Christelis et al. (2010) examine the role of the cognitive abilities in shaping the 
portfolio choice in the SHARE data using the multiple imputations analysis, and find that the 
cognitive abilities are positively associated with the probability of holding risky assets, but 
do not affect the share invested in them. The authors draw attention to the importance of 
accounting for the high item non-response rates in the SHARE. The survey provides the 
multiple imputed values for a set of variables including the economic variables, the numeracy 
and the perceived health status for both the respondents and the non-responding partners 
(NRPs). Christelis (2011) emphasizes that the analyses based only on the observations with 
the complete records, since information is unlikely to be missing completely at random, are 
likely to be biased and inconsistent (Rubin, 1987; Little and Rubin, 2002). This is especially 
the case in the scenario of the high incidence of missing data, as in the SHARE, since omitting 
the respondents that do not have the complete records are likely to result in the small and 
non-representative samples. 
In sum, the previous literature on health risk as a source of background risk widely 
acknowledges its effect on the households’ portfolio choice. However, the previous work 
mainly uses the US data, with the European countries rarely considered, especially in 
analyzing the intensive margin of such association. This paper studies the relation of the 
health status and the households’ portfolio choice on both extensive and intensive margin, 
through its effect on the out-of-pocket medical expenditure, particularly focusing on the role 
of the health care systems. From the methodological point of view, the analysis follows 
Christelis et al. (2010) and uses the multiple imputation analysis to obtain more reliable 
estimates. 
1.3  Methodological approach 
The unit of analysis is a household, since some information in the data source is 
available only at the household level. This is a standard data constraint in the related 
literature, with few exceptions (e.g., Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2009). 
The households invest their financial assets across different financial instruments 
with different levels of riskiness. Most of the previous contributions to the literature (recently 
e.g., Christelis et al., 2010, and Atella et al., 2012) model the participation decision with 
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probit, whereas for the allocation decision there are variety of econometric approaches. 
Heaton and Lucas (2000) focus on the individuals who hold stocks above a certain threshold 
and use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, while Curcuru et al. (2009) use the OLS 
on a sample restricted to the stockholders. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) and Christelis 
et al. (2010) use the Heckman’s selectivity adjusted model to account for the fact that many 
households do not hold any risky assets. Guiso et al. (1996), Poterba and Samwick (2003), 
Rosen and Wu (2004), and Edwards (2008) use the tobit estimator instead. While each of 
these approaches has its pros and cons, this paper opts for a tobit estimator, viewed as the 
most suited for the analysis.7 Namely, the problem at hand is perceived as a censored data, 
not a self-select data for which the Heckman model would be more suitable. More precisely, 
this analysis approaches the households’ portfolio choice as a single decision regarding the 
risky assets – decision on the share to invest in them, and once they decide the risky share, 
the share being positive or zero implies the participation or the non-participation in risky 
assets. The model, thus, implicitly assumes that the same data generating process that 
determines the censoring is the same process that determines the outcome variable. 
In the proposed econometric setting, both the participation and allocation to risky 
assets can be modeled as dependent on a latent variable, with the allocation regression seen 
as a regression with more observable information on the latent variable.  
The latent variable model can be represented as: 
 𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) , 
 
where 𝑖 represents a household, 𝑋𝑖 the observable variables affecting the latent variable, and 
𝜀𝑖  the unobservables which are assumed to be normally distributed (standard normal for 
probit), so that maximum likelihood estimation can be employed.8 
                                                          
7 Since in the SHARE data, the households do not have a high concentration of the portfolio shares close to 
unity, the analysis uses the simpler one-limit version of the estimator with lower limit at zero. This estimator is 
also used in Rosen and Wu (2004). 
8 It might not be convenient to give an economic interpretation to a latent variable, especially in the tobit 
estimation. Some prefer to refer to it as a desired outcome variable – thus, in the present analysis, the desired 
share invested in stocks. 
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For the participation dummy variable 𝑌𝑖
𝑝
, we observe 1 if 𝑌𝑖
∗ ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. This can 
be written as:  
1 if 𝑌𝑖
∗ ≥ 0 
0 if 𝑌𝑖
∗ < 0 
 
For the allocation (share) variable 𝑌𝑖
𝑎, we observe 𝑌𝑖
∗ if 𝑌𝑖
∗ ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. This can be 
written as:  
    𝑌𝑖
∗ if 𝑌𝑖
∗ ≥ 0 
0 if 𝑌𝑖
∗ < 0 
 
Thus, both the participation and the allocation analysis, probit and tobit respectively, have 
the same structural model, just different measurement models – how the latent variable 𝑌𝑖
∗ is 
translated into 𝑌𝑖 is different (more information in tobit). 
As also argued by Rosen and Wu (2004), it is difficult to find a compelling reason to 
use different variables for the allocation regression compared to the participation regression. 
This is even more so in the understanding of a single investment decision adopted in the 
present paper, so this analysis follows the usual practice and use the same set of the covariates 
in both equations. 
In particular, following Atella et al. (2012), the portfolio choice of household 𝑖 living 
in a country 𝑗 can be represented as: 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑓(𝐻𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗) (2) , 
 
Where i is a household and j is a country. When analyzing the participation decision 
(extensive margin), 𝑌𝑖,𝑗 is binary variable being equal to 1 if household holds risky assets and 
0 otherwise, and in the allocation decision (intensive margin) 𝑌𝑖,𝑗 is a continuous variable 
bounded between 0 and 1 indicating the share of household financial portfolio held in the 
risky assets. The other two elements are household observables 𝐻𝑖,𝑗, and the system-wide 












The main variable of interest is the health status. The model controls for a set of socio-
economic variables found in the literature to be significant in explaining the patterns of 
portfolio choice. These include household size, age, gender, marital status, education, 
income, wealth, bequest motives, cognitive abilities and social interactions. 
System-wide characteristics: 
The generosity of the health care system protection may be crucial in the extent to 
which household's health status shapes her portfolio decision, since less protective health 
systems shield less against unexpected medical expenditure. Therefore, equation (1) can be 
rewritten as: 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑓(𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑗, 𝐻𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 , 𝑆𝑗) (3) , 
 
where 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑗 represents the household's health status, 𝐻𝑖,𝑗
𝑑  are the non-health related 
household characteristics (demographic and socio-economic observables) and 𝑆𝑗  system-
wide observable characteristics . 
Whenever a country is characterized by the NHS, a full (or nearly full) public 
coverage is guaranteed, thus the individual health-related characteristics should be less (if at 
all) relevant in shaping households’ portfolio choice. 
Empirical specification: 
To test the model, I follow Atella et al. (2012) and split the sample according to the 
dummy variable being 1 if the residence of a household is the NHS country (Sweden, 
Denmark, Italy, Spain) and 0 if the non-NHS country (Belgium, Austria, Netherlands, 
Germany, France, Switzerland, Greece). This dummy is a crude indicator of the degree to 
which the health care system shields from the health-related financial risks. 
Therefore, the latent variable in equation (1) can be represented as: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
∗ =  Σj𝛽0,𝑗,𝑘𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑘𝐻𝑆i,j,k + Σn𝛽𝑛,𝑘𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑛,𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 
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where 𝑖  represents a household, 𝑗  represents a country, and 𝑘  represents the indicator 
whether country belongs to the group having the NHS. Φ represents the cumulative 
distribution function of a standard normal distribution, 𝐶𝑗 is a vector of country dummies, 
capturing the country fixed effects, 𝐻𝑆 is a variable describing household’s health status, 𝐻 
is a vector of other controls, including the demographic and socio-economic household 
observables (n), and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term which is standard normally distributed. 
Thus, empirical representation of equation (3) for probit is: 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  =  Φ(Σj𝛽0,𝑗,𝑘𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑘𝐻𝑆𝑖,j,k +  Σn𝛽𝑛,𝑘𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑛,𝑘) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 (4) , 
 
Let 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 =Σj𝛽0,𝑗,𝑘𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑘𝐻𝑆i,j,k +  Σn𝛽𝑛,𝑘𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑛,𝑘 , the empirical representation of 
equation (2) for tobit is:  




) [ 𝑋𝑖 












  is the inverse Mills ratio,  ϭ is the variance of the error term  𝜀𝑖 which 
is normally distributed. 
By splitting the sample according to the health system in place, the model does not 
explicitly account for other differences in the country-specific institutions and environmental 
determinants (e.g., the differences in the depth of the stock market, different pension systems, 
varying degrees of the bankruptcy protection). Thus, we control for the country fixed effects. 
The focus of the analysis then boils down to testing the difference between the two 
subsamples in the sensitivity of the households’ portfolio choice to their health status. The 
hypothesis may be formalized in the following way: 
Ceteris paribus, poorer health is associated with a lower probability of holding risky 
assets and lower share invested in those assets, but these correlations are weaker (if any) in 
countries with a full-coverage protective National Health Systems – i.e., the coefficient 𝛽1,𝑘 
should be less negative or non-significant in countries where k=1. 
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Both probit and tobit parameters of interest are estimated by the Maximum 
Likelihood, developing own estimation algorithm to address the peculiarity of the data at 
hand (to be discussed in the next section). 
Variable selection: 
The empirical analysis follows the approach and similar definition of the variables 
found in the related literature, with the aim of better comparability of the empirical findings. 
To capture the health risk faced by the individuals, we use the self-reported health 
status, rather than the objective health status for several reasons. Firstly, even if the objective 
health measures are more reliable since less likely to be affected by the measurement error, 
if the people buffer the health risks by altering their portfolio, what affects this decision is 
how they feel (a subjective perspective), rather than how they (objectively) are. The self-
reports of general health have proved to be useful indicators of an individual’s health by 
many authors (see for example Benyamini and Idler, 1997 and Jürges, 2007). Rosen and Wu 
(2004) report that “Poor self-reported health is strongly correlated with mortality even after 
controlling for indices of functional capacity, the presence of specific medical conditions and 
physician health assessments.” 9 
Following a rich body of empirical literature, the model controls for many socio-
economic observables which are generally found to be highly associated with the household 
portfolio choice. When it comes to the demographic variables, the model includes several 
variables widely used throughout the literature. Age enters the regression in both linear and 
quadratic terms to capture the life-cicle effect – since the risk aversion and the time horizon 
vary with it (Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002; Dohmen et al., 2011; Guiso and Paiella 2008). 
On the intensive margin, age may also capture a traditional investment advice – namely, a 
rule of thumb which negatively relates the portfolio risky share and age (Malkiel, 1999). 
Gender is also controlled for to capture possible gaps between male and female risk attitudes, 
                                                          
9 Additionally, using the SHARE data, Atella et al. (2012) find that when included in a regression for the 
stockholding, their measure of the objective health status is not significant at conventional significance levels, 
unlike the perceived health status. 
 
Chapter 1: Household Portfolio Choice and Health Care Systems 
16 
 
since a large set of papers find that the risk aversion is higher for women than for men (in 
experimental setting e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002 and Fehr-Duda et al., 2006; using field and 
survey data e.g., Kimball et al., 2008, Guiso and Paiella, 2008, Dohmen et al., 2011). A 
dummy for being married is also included in the model because agents with different marital 
status may differ in their perceptions of and preferences for risk (e.g., Bertocchi et al., 2011) 
and a dummy that indicates high educational achievement, since education is found to be 
associated with the portfolio choice (e.g., Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002) - the reason of which 
might lay in the information barriers. Additionally, the cognitive abilities may affect portfolio 
choice in a similar way as education and are found to have independent effect from it 
(Christelis et al., 2010). The model focuses on those measures of cognitive abilities that are 
relevant for the financial investment. These include numeracy, i.e., the ability to perform 
numerical operations, fluency, i.e., the ability of planning and executive function and recall, 
i.e., the ability to compare facts and situations at the distant points in time. Following the 
recent related literature, the model also controls for the social interactions that are found to 
affect the financial decisions (in addition to Christelis et al., 2010, see e.g., Hong et al., 2004). 
To capture the household’s budget constraint, the model includes the household total 
income and net wealth.10 Both are defined in the form of quantiles, as a more flexible 
specification which enables the model to capture the nonlinear relationship with the 
dependent variable. This is particularly important since the transaction costs might 
discourage the risky assets holding only for low levels of income and wealth (Christelis et 
al., 2010). 
Portfolio of the elderly might be different than those of younger population because 
the elderly face much more mortality risk, which shortens their planning horizon. The bequest 
motives may extend this time horizon and reduce the effect of mortality risk (Hurd, 2002), 
thus may be particularly important among the elderly. Therefore, the model also controls for 
the  intention to leave a bequest. 
                                                          
10 Controlling for wealth stems both from the theory of „cash on hand“ as an important determinant of asset 
holding and the need to avoid confounding the role of other covariates with that of wealth which may happen 
when wealth is excluded from the regression. 
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As reported by Rosen and Wu (2004), “in psychology literature some argue that an 
individual’s subjective health evaluations can be distorted by mood” (Schmidt et al., 1996). 
Thus, the model also includes a dummy variable capturing low mood, similar to Christelis et 
al. (2010).  
1.4  Data 
The data used in this paper are drawn from 2004 (Wave 1) Release 2.5.0 Survey of 
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The SHARE was patterned after the US 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and the English Health and Retirement Study (ELSA). 
It biannually surveys the households which are representative of the population of aged 50 
or more in 12 (and increasing number of) European countries – Austria, Germany, 
Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Greece, and 
Israel – resulting in 35,003 individuals (including 3,888 non-responding partners) and 19,548 
households. Furthermore, the survey questionnaires are standardized across countries, 
allowing detailed and reliable comparisons. 
The SHARE encompasses detailed information on series of different questions 
ranging from the basic demographic information – including household size, age, gender, 
marital status, education, employment – to different types of cognitive abilities, intensity of 
social interactions, various economic variables and finally both physical and mental health. 
Financial assets information covers ownership and amounts invested in different assets, 
varying in their riskiness.11 Thus, the dataset is particularly suited to study the association 
between the health risk with the social characteristics and economic outcomes. 
The Israeli observations are excluded from the dataset in this paper, since for this 
country not all variables relevant for the analyses were available. The analysis also excludes 
the households in which (at least one of) the financial respondent(s) is aged over 90 or below 
50.12 The resulting sample has 27,714 individuals and 16,549 households.13 
                                                          
11 See Appendix A.1. for more details on economic variables. 
12 The latter case happens when there is an eligible household member over 50, therefore the household is 
eligible for the SHARE interview, her partner is also a financial respondent and younger than her. 
13 By including the imputed data, the dataset used in this paper is threefold larger than Atella et al. (2012). 
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1.4.1 The health care systems of SHARE countries 
The eleven countries included in the SHARE have quite heterogeneous health care 
systems. In this paper they are classified according to the criteria suggested by Atella et al. 
(2012).14 
The countries are divided in two groups according to whether they have a full-
coverage national health service. The NHS countries include Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Spain, 
which, as described by Allin (2005) share a few key characteristics. They are all 
predominantly financed through the general taxation and grant the universal access to a 
uniform level of care throughout the country. Private health insurance is not particularly 
widespread, and if any exists it is used to purchase additional services and to avoid waiting 
for the service (Atella et al., 2012).15 All other countries, including Austria, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany, France, Switzerland and Greece, are classified as the non-NHS countries. 
In Austria, 95% of population is covered by the mandatory health insurance, 2% by the 
voluntary health insurance, while the remaining 3% are not covered by any insurance. In the 
Netherlands, the public health care system covers only “exceptional medical expenses” 
(long-term care or high-cost treatments), while for all other health expenditure people must 
turn to the compulsory sickness funds. In Belgium, the system is based on a compulsory 
social health insurance, which reimburses the out-of-pocket medical expenditure depending 
on the nature of the service, the legal status of the provider and the status of the insured 
person, while sickness funds offer the complementary health insurance. In Germany, the 
system features three co-existing schemes, statutory, private and governmental, while only 
3% is covered by governmental schemes. The French health system is also based on three 
main schemes general (84%), agricultural (7%) and self-employed scheme (5%), which are 
complemented by a voluntary private health insurance, covering 95% of the population. In 
Switzerland, the health care system provides universal coverage, but the service is provided 
through multiple private insurers in a regulated competitive market. Finally, the Greek health 
                                                          
14 The authors, however, did not include Belgium in the analysis, since the data for that country were not yet 
fully available. 
15 The share of people who hold only national health insurance is 88.2% for the NHS countries on average, 
compared to 67% in the non-NHS countries.    
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care system is characterized by the national health care system coexisting with compulsory 
social insurance (held by 97% of the population) and voluntary private health insurance 
(8%).16 
Comparing the countries across several indicators, Atella et al. (2012) report that in 
the NHS group, there is a full population coverage, medical expenditures are mostly publicly 
financed and the average share of out-of-pocket expenditures (OOP) is slightly lower than in 
non-NHS group. 17  In sum, in the NHS countries there is a higher degree of publicly 
guaranteed protection against health related financial risks than in the non-NHS countries. 
1.4.2 Accounting for non-response 
Being a large household survey, the SHARE suffers from high item non-response 
rate, which can substantially bias estimates and also lead to a large efficiency loss, especially 
with many variables entering the regression equation. 
Moreover, the missingness of information in our sample is the highest for the 
economic variables (see Table 1), since these information are deemed sensitive by many 
respondents. It is essential to use all the imputed data, particularly since health information 
is central to the analysis and the non-response is likely to be strongly positively correlated 
with bad health status (Hoeymans et al., 1998). The same holds for the non-responding 
partners (NRPs), since ignoring them may result in overestimating the health status at the 
household level and in biased inference. 
This paper addresses item non-response explicitly by exploiting the multiple 
imputations (MI) of missing data provided by the SHARE, as a way to obtain valid statistical 
inference in the item non-response scenario.18 The imputations allow us to more accurately 
                                                          
16 These summaries are from Atella et al. (2012), based on Allin et al. (2005). 
17 The authors discuss the challenges in using average OOP expenditures to compare the protection provided 
by the health care systems in different countries. Most importantly, these expenditures are endogenous (since, 
ceteris paribus, people will seek more health services in a system where they have to pay less out of their own 
pocket) and they are not uniformly recorded (what counts as OOP varies across countries).  
18 The MI are a simulation-based approach for analyzing incomplete data whose objective is not to predict 
missing values as close as possible to the true ones but to handle the missing data in a way resulting in valid 
statistical inference (Rubin, 1996). The MI replaces the missing values with the multiple simulated values to 
complete the data, then the standard analysis should be applied to each completed dataset, and the obtained 
parameter estimates adjusted for missing-data uncertainty using the "Rubin combination rules" as described in 
Rubin (1987). 
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assess the health-related concerns of a household and to obtain the share invested in stocks, 
thus, investigate the portfolio allocation. The SHARE imputation process yields 5 implicate 
datasets.19 The bias of the standard errors of the estimates depends on the fraction of the 
missing data, but this bias decreases with the number of implicates (as shown by Rubin, 
1987). Following Christelis et al. (2010), when assessing missingness of data, the present 
analysis adopts the most stringent definition of the imputed values where a value of a 
household level variable is considered imputed if any of its constituent parts is imputed for 
any household member. Thus, the incidence of missing values is particularly high for total 
income (63.32%) and net wealth (63.03%), since these variables are sum of many elements. 
The statistics on the proportion of missing data for the imputed variables (prior to the 
imputation) used in this paper are reported in Table 1. 
1.4.3 The choice of outcome variables 
To define the dependent variables, the paper adopts two definitions of 
stockownership: direct stockownership (holding stocks directly) and total stockownership 
(holding stocks directly or in mutual funds/individual retirement accounts that invest mostly 
in stocks). 
In the allocation analysis, the paper focuses on the share in stocks held only directly 
following Christelis et al. (2010), since for the indirect stockholding (through the mutual 
funds or individual retirement accounts) there are no exact amounts reported nor the 
imputations provided.20 
As emphasized by Heaton and Lucas (2000) "An important issue in studying portfolio 
shares is how broadly the measure of wealth in the denominator should be defined. Different 
pictures can emerge if one uses financial assets, all physical assets (including homes and 
automobiles), or physical assets plus human capital as the relevant measure of wealth.” This 
paper follows most of the recent literature (e.g., Edwards, 2008 and Christelis et al., 2010), 
and uses gross financial assets in the denominator, therefore focusing on the allocation 
between different types of financial assets. Beyond being an indicator of diversification 
                                                          
19 For the description of the SHARE imputation process see Christelis (2008). 
20 For the mutual funds and IRAs the financial respondents are asked only whether they invest mostly in bonds, 
about equally in both bonds and stocks or mostly in stocks. 
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between the risk categories, this measure is found by Calvet et al. (2009) to be a reasonable 
diversification proxy for Sharpe ratio, for which the computation requires more dissagregated 
data than available in the SHARE.21 Namely, when this proxy is used in the regression on 
household characteristics, the authors obtain results broadly consistent with the results 
obtained when they use Sharpe ratio itself. Thus, the regression of determinants of share of 
risky assets can also provide some intuition on association of health with 
(under)diversification within the risk categories. 
1.4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis.22 The median household has 2 members, about every fifth household having non-
responding partner. The median financial respondent is about 64 years old, married and 
equally likely to be male and female. Household’s average perceived health-status is 3.16 on 
1 (Excellent) to 5 (Poor) US scale - so something between Good and Fair. 
When it comes to the cognitive abilities, the average financial respondent displays 
fairly good level of all three measures: numerical skills (around 3 correct answers), fluency 
(around 18 animals named) and memory (around 5 recalled). Around 19% of financial 
respondents take part in some social activity. The median household head assigns probability 
of 60% to leaving an inheritance of over 50,000€. A household has median annual income of 
slightly less than 27,000 € (mean 41,000 €) and net wealth of around 150,000€ (mean 307,400 
€). It has around 10,400€ (mean 44,500€) of gross financial assets. From those having 
positive amount of financial assets (14,249 households), around 4% is directly invested in 
stocks. 
  
                                                          
21 The SHARE dataset, as most large survey datasets, does not report holdings in the specific assets, but only 
in the asset classes. 
22 For more details on variables construction see Appendix A.2. 
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1.5 Econometric analysis and results 
The analysis includes two dependent variables: a) binary variable for holding risky 
assets (extensive margin) b) share of funds invested in risky assets (intensive margin). The 
analysis computes the portfolio shares for all individuals who reported positive financial 
assets.23 
In both the participation and the allocation analasys, separate models for two 
measures of self-reported health status are estimated – in a discrete form and in a dummy 
form.24 Each regression is estimated for full sample, and then separately for NHS and non-
NHS countries, obtaining coefficients by Rubin combination rules (Rubin, 1987). More 
specifically, the coefficients are computed as the mean of coefficients estimated on five 
individual implicate datasets and the standard errors are computed taking into account both 
within and between imputation variability of the five estimated standard errors.25 Following 
the commonly used practice, the marginal effects are reported at the (weighted) means of 
variables (combining all 5 implicate datasets). Since both probit and tobit models are non-
linear, the marginal effects are non-linear combinations of the coefficients, thus the 
computation of the corresponding standard errors is not straightforward. Following Christelis 
et al. (2010), the estimation employs the bootstrap method to obtain the standard errors.26 
1.5.1 The extensive margin (probabilities of stockholding) 
Probit regressions for participation decision are estimated for both direct stockholding 
and the total stockholding. The estimates of the marginal effects and the corresponding 
                                                          
23 In the literature, some even exclude the households whose net financial position falls below some threshold 
(Heaton and Lucas, 2000, Curcuru et al., 2009). When computing the risky share, it is necessary to drop at least 
the households without any financial assets in order to exclude division by zero. 
24 For more details on how these variables are defined and constructed see Appendix A.2.  
25 Let ?̂?𝑚 denote the vector of parameter estimates for imputation m, and M be the number of imputations, then 





𝑚=1 . The variances of these estimates consist of two unequally weighted 
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26 For the details on estimation algorithm, please see Appendix A.3. 
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standard errors are reported in Table 3 for the direct stockholding and Table 4 for the total 
stockholding.  
In support of our hypothesis, the two subsamples contrast substantially with respect 
to the association of stockholding with health status. These differences are net of the 
institutional differences across countries, since we control for the country fixed effects. The 
marginal effects on both self-perceived health measures (discrete and dummy) are found to 
be negative and statistically significant in the non-NHS countries and insignificant in the 
NHS countries, suggesting that the probability of holding risky assets decreases with 
worsening of the perceived health status, but only in the countries where the health-related 
financial risks are not mediated by the highly-protective NHS. The marginal effects are 
somewhat more precisely estimated for the total stockholding, than for the direct 
stockholding, and in the former regression in the non-NHS countries are the magnitude of -
0.015 for the discrete, and -0.019 for the dummy measure of the health status and significant 
at 1% significance level. Hence, lower health status has no effect on the propensity to hold 
stocks in the NHS countries, whereas this effect is negative and economically significant in 
the non-NHS countries - one standard deviation (0.9) decreases the probability of holding the 
risky assets directly by 0.9 x (-0.009) = 0.8 percentage points and directly or indirectly by 
0.9 x (-0.015) = 1.35 percentage points. The effect of the health status dummy going from 0 
to 1 is associated with an increase in the probability of owing risky assets of 1.4 percent for 
the direct stockholding and 1.9 percent for the total stockholding. 
Consistently, the results show that the marginal effect of the probability of leaving a 
bequest is significant for the full sample, but when splitting the sample, becomes larger in 
magnitude and significant in the non-NHS countries, while insignificant in the NHS 
countries. As health care is provided not only through the formal insurance contracts, but 
also through the informal (family) networks, the planned bequests may informally hedge 
through the intergenerational care arrangements (Bernheim et al., 1985). Namely, the parents 
may be able to hedge the health-related financial risks by bargaining care from their children 
through the promised inheritance, which reduces household’s overall exposure to the 
background risk and, thus, encourages investment in the risky assets. Since in the non-NHS 
countries the households are not shielded from OOP medical expenditure risk by the 
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protective, publicly organized health system, the informal care arrangements might be 
particularly important for those households.27 The importance of the bequest motives as a 
hedge against the health-related financial risks might be different for singles and couples, 
since a partner can act as a hedge himself.  On one hand, the individuals may be more likely 
to bargain care from their children when having no partner to rely on in case of falling ill. On 
the other hand, the children might be more likely to accept such financial responsibility if 
their parents are in a couple, since the children anticipate that the parents will rely on each 
other in case of need (thus they foresee lower participation in their parents’ medical 
expenditure). The results show no clear empirical support for either interpretation.28 
In both Table 3 and 4, standard control variables display the expected signs. The 
probability of owning the risky assets increases with total income and net wealth in a full 
sample and both subsamples, and, as expected, this relationship is not linear. The marginal 
effects of household size and age are not statistically significant in either sample. Gender gap 
in inclination towards investing in the risky assets is confirmed, having males more prone to 
such investments than females. The marital status dummy also displays the expected positive 
sign, but the effect is not precisely estimated. The marginal effects of having high education 
is found to be positive and significant in the full sample, as expected, but in a split sample 
regressions it is significant only in the non-NHS countries. A likely reason is that these 
countries feature low transparency of the financial system on average, and therefore higher 
education helps to reduce information costs more than in the NHS countries. Moreover, two 
group of countries display high difference in average education levels.29 In line with the 
findings of Christelis et al. (2010), in a full sample all three measures of cognitive abilities 
and social activities display positive association with the stockholding. 
                                                          
27 When estimating regressions for the non-NHS countries without the bequest motives among the covariates, 
the marginal effect of health status dummy for being sick increases by 5-6% in magnitude, thus providing 
further support to this hypothesis. 
28 When the models are estimated for singles and couples separately, controlling also for number of children, 
marginal effect of bequest is positive and significant for couples and non-significant for singles, which would 
support the latter interpretation. However, the marginal effect of self-reported health status also shows up as 
non-significant for singles (as found in Edwards, 2008 who uses the US data), thus the results are not convincing 
of bequests hedging singles different than couples against the health-related financial risks. 
29 Median years of education are 12 in non-NHS countries, and 6 in NHS countries, with dummy for the high 
education having the mean of 0.72 an 0.36 respectively. 
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1.5.2 The intensive margin (share of risky assets) 
As clarified in section 1.4.3., the tobit regressions for allocation among different types 
of financial assets are estimated for the direct stockholding only. The marginal effects and 
the corresponding standard errors are reported in Table 5. The results are qualitatively similar 
to those in the previous section.  
The two subsamples contrast substantially with respect to the health variable and the 
measure of the bequest motives in their portfolio association with allocation. The association 
of the portfolio allocation with both measures of self-perceived health measures (discrete and 
dummy) is found to be negative and significant in the non-NHS countries and insignificant 
in the NHS countries, suggesting that lower perceived health status is associated with a 
decrease in the share of funds directly invested in stocks, but the effect is present only in the 
countries where health-related financial risks are not mediated by the NHS. The disparity of 
importance of bequest motives, and thus the intergenerational care arrangements, between 
two subsamples is confirmed, thus showing that the informal care arrangements might play 
an important role in shaping the portfolio allocation. 
The marginal effects of the control variables go in the expected direction. The results show 
that share invested in risky assets decreases with total income, but also with net wealth, as an 
evidence of decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA).30 Coefficients on household size, age 
and marital status are again not statistically significant in either sample. The gender gap 
evidence is also confirmed, and education effect displays the disparity between two 
subsamples also in allocation regression. Unlike Christelis et al. (2010), the present analysis 
finds evidence of the cognitive abilities affecting also the intensive margin of household 
portfolio choice. This seems an intuitive result, since it is likely that the individuals with 
better cognitive abilities are better able to understand and compare different asset classes on 
a risk-adjusted basis. As expected, among three measures of cognitive abilities, numeracy 
matters the most for the portfolio choice. Sociability is again positive but not as precisely 
estimated as in probit. It seems reasonable to argue that social learning increases the 
                                                          
30 DRRA is the result also obtained in e.g., Calvet et al. (2009). 
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probability that individuals become aware about existing assets (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005), 
but there is no particular reason why sociability would affect their effective risk aversion. 
1.5.3 Robustness check – the stock market non-participation 
Following Bilias et al. (2010), in analysing the participation in risky assets by probit 
model in section 1.5.1, this robustness check restricts the sample to the households holding 
positive amount in financial assets, „not to equate the stock market non-participation with 
the decision to hold no assets at all (or the inability to do so)“. Thus, probit is re-estimated 
excluding the households with zero financial assets, so using the same sample used in the 
tobit analysis. Table 6 and 7 report the results for direct and total stockholding respectively. 
The results are robust to this alternative definition of non-participation. 
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1.6 Conclusion  
This paper uses data drawn from the SHARE sample covering the elderly population 
in Europe to investigate whether the health care systems play a role in shaping the household 
portfolio choice by providing varying degrees of protection toward the health-related 
financial risks. Specifically, we test whether a presence of the National Health System 
reduces the sensitivity of the households’ portfolio choice to their health status concerns. 
Using the multiple imputation analysis to mitigate the potential bias arising from high item 
non-response in the SHARE, the results suggest that, by increasing household’s exposure to 
health-related financial risk, less protective health care systems indeed drive sick households 
towards safer portfolios. This is documented by both probit analysis of holding the risky 
assets and tobit analysis of portfolio share invested in those assets. There is a suggestive 
evidence that the informal care arrangements in the form of bequests may (partially) 
compensate for the uncertainty arising from the lack of a full-coverage national health system 
and, thus, (partially) offset the associated effect of the health risk on the portfolio choice. 
Several other issues remain open. First is related to the measurement consistency 
across countries, namely, whether the presented evidence holds true if one uses “vignette” 
sample (to account for the potential bias in using the subjective health evaluations). Second, 
further examination of how and to which extent the informal care arrangements affect the 
association of the health status and the portfolio choice and whether the design of the 
inheritance law may play a role in this context. The question seems particularly important 
because the family arrangements can compensate for the lack of a (full) public coverage of 
health risks and, thus, offset the associated effect of health risk on the portfolio choice. This 
question requires additional data beyond the one provided by the SHARE and is left to future 
research. 
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Amount held in stocks directly 2,457 16,549 14.85 
Gross financial assets 8,717 16,549 52.67 
Share invested in risky assets 8,497 14,249 59.63 
Total income 10,479 16,549 63.32 
Net worth 10,431 16,549 63.03 




Chapter 1: Household Portfolio Choice and Health Care Systems 
33 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLES MEAN MEDIAN SD MIN MAX OBS 
household size 2.13 2 1.04 1 9 16549 
household has a                                                      
non-responding partner 0.21   0.40 0 1 16549 
age 65.20 64.42 9.75 50.00 89.92 16549 
male 0.50   0.50 0 1 16549 
married 0.64   0.48 0 1 16549 
years of education 9.86 10.5 4.84 0 21 16549 
PHS (discrete, US scale: 
from 1 "Excellent"  to 5 
"Poor") 
3.16 3 0.90 1 5 16549 
PHS (dummy,                                     
1 if less than good health) 0.44   0.50 0 1 16549 
low mood 0.07   0.26 0 1 16549 
numeracy 3.28 3 1.13 1 5 16549 
fluency 18.15 17.5 7.21 0 90 16549 
recall 4.68 5 1.78 0 10 16549 
sociability 0.19   0.39 0 1 16549 
Probability of leaving 
inheritance >50.000 53.70  60 43.94 0 100 16549 
total income 4.10 2.66 4.83 0 90.96 16549 
net worth 30.74 14.96 89.92 -224.88 2918.08 16549 
gross financial assets 4.45 1.04 14.08 0 626.65 16549 
Dummy for directly 
investing in risky assets 0.14   0.34 0 1 16549 
Dummy for indirectly 
investing in risky assets 0.05   0.22 0 1 16549 
Dummy for investing in 
risky assets (directly or 
indirectly) 
0.16   0.37 0 1 16549 
Amount directly invested in 
risky assets 0.48 0 4.47 0 407.39 16549 
Share directly invested in 
risky assets 0.04 0 0.14 0 1 14249 
NHS_dummy 0.36    0 1 16549 
Austria 0.03    0 1 16549 
Germany 0.28    0 1 16549 
Sweden 0.03    0 1 16549 
the Netherlands 0.05    0 1 16549 
Spain 0.12    0 1 16549 
Italy 0.19    0 1 16549 
France 0.19    0 1 16549 
Denmark 0.02    0 1 16549 
Greece 0.04    0 1 16549 
Switzerland 0.02    0 1 16549 
Belgium 0.03    0 1 16549 
All variables are reported at the household level. Statistics are computed using the sample weights. 
All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted and in 10.000 of Euros. 
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Table 3. Participation decision/direct stockholding – probit estimates 
  Probit direct stockholding Probit direct stockholding 











              
HS discrete -0.0052* -0.0094** 0.0026       
  (0.003) (0.0045) (0.0031)       
HS dummy * 
 
      -0.0079 -0.0137** 0.004 
      (0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0048) 
low mood * -0.0368** -0.0411 -0.035* -0.0398** -0.0453 -0.0323* 




0.0432*** 0.0375* 0.0468** 0.0432*** 0.0375* 0.0468** 




0.0993*** 0.1006*** 0.0813*** 0.0993*** 0.1006*** 0.0813*** 




0.1404*** 0.1339*** 0.13*** 0.1404*** 0.1339*** 0.1301*** 
(0.0148) (0.0179) (0.0225) (0.0148) (0.0179) 0.0285 
Net worth q2* 0.0946*** 0.0998*** 0.0657*** 0.0946*** 0.0998*** (0.0657***) 
  (0.0161) (0.0193) (0.0157) (0.0161) (0.0193) 0.0192 
Net worth  q3* 0.1362*** 0.1259*** 0.134*** 0.1362*** 0.1259*** 0.1344*** 
  (0.0153) (0.0182) (0.0216) (0.0153) (0.0182) (0.0268) 
Net worth  q4* 0.2177*** 0.193*** 0.228*** 0.2177*** 0.193*** 0.2276*** 
  (0.013) (0.0199) (0.0212) (0.013) (0.0199) (0.0228) 
Household size -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0017 
  (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0035) (0.004) (0.0061) (0.0033) 
Age 0.0029 0.0012 0.0054 0.0033 0.0015 0.0048 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0043) 
Age squared -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00001 
  (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
Male * 
  
0.0412*** 0.0463*** 0.0276*** 0.044*** 0.0499*** 0.0257** 
(0.008) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0087) (0.0113) (0.0105) 
Married * 0.0145 0.0174 0.0068 0.0155 0.0189 0.0063 




0.0393*** 0.0571*** 0.0208 0.0421*** 0.0619*** 0.0193 
(0.0087) (0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0093) (0.0142) (0.012) 
Numeracy 0.0159*** 0.0207*** 0.0072** 0.0182*** 0.0254*** 0.0065** 
  (0.0028) (0.0042) (0.003) (0.0034) (0.0056) (0.003) 
Fluency 0.0012*** 0.0014** 0.0008 0.0014*** 0.0017*** 0.0007 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Recall 0.0041** 0.0043* 0.0038* 0.0047** 0.0053* 0.0034* 
  (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.002) 
Sociability * 0.0223** 0.0212* 0.028** 0.0237** 0.0227* 0.0261** 
  (0.0092) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0096) (0.0122) (0.0114) 
Inheritance 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.00004 0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.00004 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Observations 16549 10621 5928 16549 10621 5928 
R2 0.24 0.22 0.30 0.24 0.22 0.30 
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at the weighted means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. The R² measure is computed as in Harel, O. (2009.) 
The results are a combination of those of separate regressions for each implicate dataset, using the multiple imputation methodology of Rubin 
(1987). Country fixed effects included, but not reported. Categorical variables are marked with an asterix. Monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted 
and in 10.000 of Euros. 
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 Table 4. Participation decision/total stockholding – probit estimates 
  Probit total stockholding Probit total stockholding 











              
HS discrete -0.0082** -0.015*** 0.0036    
  (0.0036) (0.005) (0.0041)    
HS dummy * 
 
   -0.0112** -0.0189*** 0.0053 
   (0.005) (0.0062) (0.0055) 
low mood *  -0.0275 -0.0272 -0.0295 -0.0294 -0.0289 -0.0268 
  (0.0196) (0.0291) (0.0199) (0.0211) (0.0318) (0.0179) 
Total income q2* 
 
0.0503*** 0.0392** 0.0542*** 0.0503*** 0.0392** 0.0542*** 
(0.0151) (0.0182) (0.021) (0.0151) (0.0182) (0.021) 
Total income q3* 
 
0.101*** 0.0872*** 0.0988*** 0.101*** 0.0872*** 0.0988*** 
(0.0127) (0.0167) (0.0221) (0.0127) (0.0167) (0.0221) 
Total income q4* 
 
0.1378*** 0.1147*** 0.1561*** 0.1378*** 0.1147*** 0.1561*** 
(0.0121) (0.0162) (0.0271) (0.0121) (0.0162) (0.0271) 
Net worth q2* 0.0855*** 0.087*** 0.0587*** 0.0855*** 0.087*** 0.0587*** 
  (0.0154) (0.0165) (0.0193) (0.0154) (0.0165) (0.0193) 
Net worth  q3* 0.1197*** 0.1052*** 0.1222*** 0.1197*** 0.1052*** 0.1222*** 
  (0.0143) (0.0165) (0.0267) (0.0143) (0.0165) (0.0267) 
Net worth  q4* 0.1861*** 0.1481*** 0.223*** 0.1861*** 0.1481*** 0.223*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0147) (0.0232) (0.0231) 
Household size -0.0037 -0.0023 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0029 -0.0035 
  (0.0041) (0.0059) (0.004) (0.0047) (0.0075) (0.0034) 
Age 0.0072 0.0062 0.0073 0.0084 0.0079 0.0063 
  (0.0047) (0.0067) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0086) (0.0049) 
Age squared -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) 
Male * 
  
0.0477*** 0.0526*** 0.032*** 0.0503*** 0.0547*** 0.0294*** 
(0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0089) (0.0109) (0.0107) 
Married * 0.0125 0.0149 0.0045 0.0132 0.0156 0.0041 




0.0365*** 0.0491*** 0.017 0.0387*** 0.0515*** 0.0156 
(0.0093) (0.0136) (0.013) (0.0098) (0.0144) (0.0119) 
Numeracy 0.019*** 0.0223*** 0.0105*** 0.0222*** 0.0282*** 0.0091*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.006) (0.0034) 
Fluency 0.0018*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.0021*** 0.0025*** 0.0009* 
  (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
Recall 0.0058*** 0.0068** 0.0036 0.0068*** 0.0086** 0.0031 
  (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.002) 
Sociability * 0.0179* 0.0142 0.031** 0.0188* 0.0147 0.0286** 
  (0.0095) (0.012) (0.0134) (0.0099) (0.0123) (0.0124) 
Inheritance 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Observations 16549 10621 5928 16549 10621 5928 
R2 0.26 0.22 0.35 0.26 0.22 0.35 
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at the weighted means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. The R² measure is computed as in Harel, O. (2009.) 
The results are a combination of those of separate regressions for each implicate dataset, using the multiple imputation methodology of Rubin 
(1987). Country fixed effects included, but not reported. Categorical variables are marked with an asterix. Monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted 
and in 10.000 of Euros. 
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Table 5. Allocation decision/direct stockholding – tobit estimates 
  Tobit direct stockholding Tobit direct stockholding 











              
HS discrete -0.0026 -0.005*** 0.0026     
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0021)     
HS dummy * 
 
      -0.0078 -0.0064** 0.0002 
      (0.005) (0.003) (0.0131) 
low mood * -0.038** -0.0436 -0.0411 -0.0402** -0.0459 -0.0375 




0.0391*** 0.0324* 0.0488** 0.0391*** 0.0316* 0.0519*** 




0.0939*** 0.0919*** 0.0881*** 0.0939*** 0.0945*** 0.0925*** 




0.123*** 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.1226*** 0.1209*** 0.1258*** 
(0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0275) (0.0155) (0.0182) (0.0253) 
Net worth q2* 0.0808*** 0.0863*** 0.0479** 0.0808*** 0.0876*** 0.0501** 
  (0.0167) (0.0201) (0.0192) (0.0167) (0.0215) (0.0199) 
Net worth  q3* 0.115*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.1147*** 0.1093*** 0.1095*** 
  (0.0167) (0.0188) (0.0247) (0.0167) (0.0199) (0.024) 
Net worth  q4* 0.186*** 0.166*** 0.173*** 0.1859*** 0.1887*** 0.1744*** 
  (0.0154) (0.0172) (0.023) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0218) 
Household size -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0012 
  (0.002) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0028) 
Age 0.0019 0.0014 0.0034 0.0022 0.0013 0.0035 
  (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
Age squared -.0000141 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.000009 -0.00003 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Male * 
  
0.0354*** 0.0366*** 0.0302** 0.037*** 0.0371*** 0.03** 
(0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0142) (0.01) (0.0105) (0.0142) 
Married * 0.0084 0.0133 -0.0031 0.0088 0.0133 -0.0019 




0.035*** 0.058*** 0.013 0.0367*** 0.0588*** 0.0126 
(0.0104) (0.014) (0.0138) (0.011) (0.014) (0.0139) 
Numeracy 0.008*** 0.0096*** 0.0049* 0.009*** 0.0096*** 0.0048* 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0029) 
Fluency 0.0006*** 0.0008** 0.0001 0.0007*** 0.0008** 0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Recall 0.002** 0.0017 0.0033** 0.0023** 0.0018 0.0033** 
  (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.001) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Sociability * 0.0164* 0.0168 0.0182 0.0171* 0.0173 0.0169 
  (0.0093) (0.0125) (0.012) (0.0097) (0.0126) (0.0118) 
Inheritance 0.0001* 0.0001*** -0.000003 0.0001* 0.0001*** -0.000005 
  (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001) 
Observations 14249 9313 4936 9313 9313 4936 
R2 0.19 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.09 
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at the weighted means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, calculated using 50 bootstrap replications. The R² measure is computed as in Harel, O. (2009.). 
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Table 6. Participation decision/direct stockholding: 
sample restricted to the households with positive amount invested in financial assets 
  Probit direct stockholding Probit direct stockholding 











              
HS discrete -0.0062* -0.01* 0.0018       
  (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0041)       
HS dummy * 
 
      -0.0093 -0.0138* 0.0027 
      (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0051) 
low mood * -0.0357** -0.0399 -0.0369 -0.0405** -0.0435* -0.0354* 




0.0381** 0.0323 0.0469** 0.039*** 0.0323 0.0469** 




0.0918*** 0.0927*** 0.0811*** 0.0917*** 0.0927*** 0.0811*** 




0.1335*** 0.1279*** 0.13*** 0.1304*** 0.1279*** 0.1295*** 
(0.0131) (0.0215) (0.026) (0.0119) (0.0215) (0.0249) 
Net worth q2* 0.0925*** 0.0973*** 0.064*** 0.0924*** 0.0973*** 0.064** 
  (0.0171) (0.0229) (0.0222) (0.0168) (0.0229) (0.0265) 
Net worth  q3* 0.1299*** 0.1219*** 0.128*** 0.1271*** 0.1219*** 0.1278*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0189) (0.0273) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.026) 
Net worth  q4* 0.206*** 0.1841*** 0.216*** 0.1877*** 0.1841*** 0.2158*** 
  (0.0157) (0.0234) (0.0246) (0.0175) (0.0234) (0.0256) 
Household size -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0017 
  (0.004) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0052) 
Age 0.0039 0.0021 0.0076 0.0052 0.0026 0.0072 
  (0.0031) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0041) (0.0073) (0.0061) 
Age squared -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00006 -0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00005 
  (0.00002) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00005) 
Male * 
  
0.0428*** 0.0471*** 0.0308** 0.0473*** 0.0502*** 0.0297** 
(0.008) (0.0114) (0.0134) (0.0089) (0.0122) (0.0144) 
Married * 0.0135 0.0165 0.0053 0.015 0.0176 0.0051 




0.0389*** 0.0579*** 0.0192 0.0431*** 0.0621*** 0.0186 
(0.0097) (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0107) (0.0163) (0.0146) 
Numeracy 0.0165*** 0.0217*** 0.0069 0.0217*** 0.0263*** 0.0064 
  (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0043) 
Fluency 0.0013** 0.0015*** 0.0005 0.0017** 0.0019*** 0.0004 
  (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Recall 0.0048** 0.0045 0.0061* 0.0063** 0.0054 0.0057* 
  (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Sociability * 0.0208*** 0.0197* 0.0271* 0.0228*** 0.0209* 0.0262* 
  (0.0081) (0.0106) (0.0141) (0.0086) (0.0112) (0.0147) 
Inheritance 0.0002*** 0.0003** 0.00006 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Observations 14249 9313 4936 14249 9313 4936 
R2 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.26 
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at the weighted means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, calculated using 50 bootstrap replications. The R² measure is computed as in Harel, O. (2009.) 
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Table 7. Participation decision/total stockholding: 
sample restricted to the households with positive amount invested in financial assets 
  Probit total stockholding Probit total stockholding 











              
HS discrete -0.011** -0.0159*** 0.003    
  (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0043)    
HS dummy * 
 
     -0.0122** -0.0189*** 0.0042 
     (0.0051) (0.0065) (0.0057) 
low mood * -0.0249 -0.0235 -0.0297 -0.0251 -0.0244 -0.0281 
  (0.0223) (0.0282) (0.0269) (0.0224) (0.0298) (0.0246) 
Total income q2* 
 
0.043*** 0.0329* 0.0547*** 0.0439*** 0.0329* 0.0547*** 
(0.0124) (0.0184) (0.0204) (0.0131) (0.0184) (0.0204) 
Total income q3* 
 
0.0867*** 0.078*** 0.0992*** 0.0911*** 0.078*** 0.0992*** 
(0.0118) (0.0195) (0.0236) (0.0128) (0.0195) (0.0236) 
Total income q4* 
 
0.1178*** 0.1068*** 0.155*** 0.1275*** 0.1068*** 0.1552*** 
(0.0104) (0.0175) (0.024) (0.011) (0.0175) (0.024) 
Net worth q2* 0.0775*** 0.0829*** 0.0538** 0.0809*** 0.0829*** 0.0538** 
  (0.013) (0.0198) (0.0245) (0.0135) (0.0198) (0.0245) 
Net worth  q3* 0.1037*** 0.0994*** 0.1117*** 0.1106*** 0.0994*** 0.1117*** 
  (0.013) (0.0149) (0.0241) (0.0136) (0.0149) (0.0241) 
Net worth  q4* 0.1447*** 0.1359*** 0.208*** 0.1701*** 0.1359*** 0.2076*** 
  (0.0179) (0.022) (0.0259) (0.016) (0.022) (0.0259) 
Household size -0.0042 -0.0021 -0.0047 -0.0044 -0.0026 -0.0043 
  (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0078) (0.005) 
Age 0.0101* 0.0077 0.01 0.0104* 0.0096 0.0091 
  (0.0053) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0055) (0.0086) (0.0075) 
Age squared -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00006) 
Male * 
  
0.051*** 0.0485*** 0.0145 0.0513*** 0.0544*** 0.034** 
(0.0089) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0091) (0.0132) (0.0162) 
Married * 0.0117 0.0533*** 0.0357** 0.0117 0.0137 0.0027 




0.0361*** 0.0133 0.0028 0.0363*** 0.05*** 0.0138 
(0.0112) (0.0155) (0.0193) (0.0113) (0.0151) (0.0153) 
Numeracy 0.0225*** 0.0232*** 0.0107** 0.0231*** 0.0291*** 0.0098** 
  (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.005) (0.0049) (0.0059) (0.0048) 
Fluency 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0007 0.0021*** 0.0028*** 0.0006 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Recall 0.0077*** 0.0071** 0.006* 0.0079*** 0.0089* 0.0055* 
  (0.003) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0046) (0.0031) 
Sociability * 0.0159* 0.0119 0.0289** 0.016* 0.0121 0.0276** 
  (0.0087) (0.0103) (0.0145) (0.0087) (0.0104) (0.014) 
Inheritance 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0002 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Observations 14249 9313 4936 14249 9313 4936 
R2 0.24 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.20 0.32 
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at the weighted means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, calculated using 200 bootstrap replications. The R² measure is computed as in Harel, O. (2009.)  




 A.1. Financial Assets  
This section provides a brief description of the construction of financial assets data in the 
SHARE, while full details are given in Christelis et al. (2005). The SHARE asks questions 
regarding the financial assets to the financial respondents only. There are questions on seven 
types of assets: i) bank, transaction or saving accounts; ii) government or corporate bonds; 
iii) stocks or shares; iv) mutual funds or managed investment accounts; v) Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs); vi) contractual savings for housing vii) term or whole life 
insurance policies. As risky assets, this paper considers stocks/shares, mutual funds invested 
mostly in stocks and IRAs invested mostly in stocks. 
The following description is from Christelis et al. (2010). For stocks/shares (held directly), 
first she is asked whether she owns that asset and then if yes, in what amount. If the 
respondent refuses to provide the answer or claims that she does not know, she is then 
introduced to the unfolding brackets sequence. The financial respondent is randomly 
assigned to one of the three thresholds (with three threshold values varying by country) and 
asked whether she holds more, less or about that threshold. Depending on her answer, she 
might then be asked the next lower or higher threshold. The thresholds impose the range of 
acceptable value of asset holding, which are taken into account during the imputation process. 
For mutual funds and IRAs, however, the information is less detailed. The financial 
respondent is still asked the same question for ownership, but then if answered affirmatively, 
the following question is regarding only the main investment profile of the mutual fund/IRA 
as “mostly in stocks,” “mostly in bonds” or “half stocks and half bonds”. The imputations 
are not provided. 
  
Chapter 1: Household Portfolio Choice and Health Care Systems 
40 
 





(dummy for stockholding) 
 𝑌𝑖
𝑎 
(share invested in stocks) 
In order to use all information available (declared or imputed), the dummy for direct 
stockholding is assumed to be 1 if a household declared to hold stocks and/or has 
positive amount invested in stocks (declared or imputed). Consistently, the dummy 
for total stockholding takes the value of 1 if a household has dummy for direct 
stockholding equal to 1 and/or has declared to have assets invested in mutual funds 
mostly in stocks or retirement accounts mostly in stocks. 
The share invested in risky assets is computed as amount invested in stocks (declared 
or imputed) divided by the amount invested in all financial assets 
Regressors   
HS discrete 
 
SHARE asks question on self-assessment of the health status on US scale 
(1 = Excellent, 2 = Very good, 3 = Good, 4 = Fair, 5 = Poor). Health status at the 
household level is computed in the discrete form as an average of the health status of 
all its eligible members.  
HS dummy 
Binary variable taking value 1 if HS discrete is higher than 3, 0 otherwise. 
Inheritance 
The average probability reported by a financial respondents of leaving an inheritance 
greater than €50.000. 
Low mood 
Binary variable taking value 1 if any of the household respondents obtains above 7 on 
EURO-D depression scale. SHARE asks questions on 12 depression symptoms 
(depression, pessimism, suicidality, guilt, sleep, interest, irritability, appetite, fatigue, 
concentration, enjoyment, tearfulness) which are part of EURO-D depression scale 
ranging from 1-12 (counting the number of symptoms reported by the respondent). 
Total income 
The SHARE generated variable equal to the sum of all household members’ income 
from all sources. 
Net wealth 
The SHARE generated variable equal to the sum of real assets – including the value 
of owned property – and of the financial assets net of any debt. 
Household size Categorical variable counting the number of household members. 
Age, Age2 Integer variable representing the average age of the financial respondents and its 
quadratic form.  
Male Binary variable taking value 1 if either of the financial respondents is male. 
Married Binary variable taking value 1 if either of the financial respondents is married. 
Higher education 
Binary variable taking value 1 if either of the financial respondents completed more 
years than duration of the current compulsory education, which is 9 years on average. 
Cognitive abilities: The average score of the households’ financial respondents on the test: 
Numeracy 
Score computed as the number of correct answers provided to 4 simple computational 
questions. 
Fluency Score computed as the number of animals named in 1 minute. 
Recall Score computed as the number of words recalled out of 10. 
Sociability 
Binary variable taking value 1 if either of the financial respondents takes part in social, 
sport, political or other community-related associations during the last month. 
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A.2.1. Aggregating to household level 
For singles, aggregating the health status to the household level is straightforward. However, 
for couples, the aggregation should be made with due caution. A natural question is whether 
the health status of each member has the same weight in affecting the household’s portfolio 
choice. Rosen and Wu (2004) investigate this issue and find that joint effect of when both 
spouses are in poor health is approximately equal to the sum of the individual spouses’ 
effects. In the present paper, thus, the health status at the household level is computed as an 
average of health status of all its eligible members. 
Only economic variables and the perceived health variable are collapsed to the household 
level including imputations, which cover also non-responding partners (NRPs), while all 
other variables – including age, gender, marital status, education, cognitive abilities, social 
interactions and intention to leave a bequest – are collapsed to the household level taking into 
account only the financial respondents (those declared to manage household finances) since 
they are the ones making investment decisions in the household. For age, cognitive abilities 
and probability of bequest, the household level variable is obtained as the average over 
household financial respondents, and for education, male dummy, married dummy, social 
interactions dummy it is the maximum over household financial respondents. This choice for 
the gender dummy at the household level was made because the data show that within the 
household with both partners being financial respondents, it is usually male who holds more 
assets and earns higher income, therefore is likely to have more bargaining power in deciding 
on asset allocation. The choice for the married dummy at the household level was driven by 
the fact that within the household with two financial respondents who are not married to each 
other, one is usually a sibling or a child of the married one, thus is likely to have less 
bargaining power in the financial decisions. Finally, the dummy for the household social 
activities takes the maximum over financial respondents since spillover of information 
acquired through the social interactions are likely to be high for the people living under the 
same roof. 
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A.3. Computational algorithm 
The results in this paper are obtained using STATA 12 software package. Although, STATA 
(11 and later versions) include the Multiple imputation (MI) package which performs Rubin 
combination rules on the coefficients, it does not allow postestimation commands such as 
margins. Thus, the estimation in this paper does not utilise the MI package, but develops own 
code for obtaining Rubin estimates of coefficients and standard errors, and corresponding 
marginal effects and their standard errors for probit and tobit. The routine is quite involved 
and dealing with such a large dataset led to the choice of reporting the marginal effects at the 
mean rather than the average marginal effects, which are found to be preferable (Train, 2003) 
but more computationally intensive. 
 
 













We investigate the determinants of households’ bank switching in 2006-2012 period 
exploiting a unique representative dataset from Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income 
and Wealth that follows the households and their bank(s) over time. Focusing on the features 
of household-bank relationship, we find that exclusivity (using a single bank), intensity 
(number of services used), and scope (bank services used) of the relationship with the bank 
play a role in shaping households’ decision to switch its bank. Moreover, we find that this 
decision is strongly and positively correlated with both taking out and paying off a mortgage. 
We also find robust evidence that risk preferences, mobility and economic condition of the 
household do not affect its propensity to switch, whereas education and financial literacy do 
matter for this decision, albeit with opposite effects. Cooperative and unlisted banks are 
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31A special thanks to Giuseppe Ilardi at Bank of Italy who provided the regression estimates based on the 
restricted SHIW dataset. 




The bank clients are increasingly taking control of their banking relationships. The 
proportion of clients at the world level planning to change banks was 12% in 2012, with 
sensitivity to fees and charges leading the change (Ernst and Young, 2012). In response, the 
banks need to embrace this trend and give greater flexibility, choice and control to their 
customers. As Ernst and Young (2012) puts it: "Giving more power to customers may feel 
uncomfortable, but in the long run banks that do so will position themselves for success in 
the future". Basel III also draws attention to bank relationship with its retail clients. The Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) liquidity requirements discriminate between “stable” and 
“unstable” deposits, whereby the condition for being  stable is that: "the depositors have other 
established relationships with the bank that make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely" 
(paragraphs 74 and 75, BIS, 2013).  
Despite these trends in retail banking and policy relevance, there is little research on 
the dynamics of household-bank relationship over time. From both banks’ and regulator’s 
perspective it is important to know what characteristics affect the ‘stability’ of a deposit. 
Banks can affect the relative stability of their deposits through their relationship with the 
clients and by attracting more stable clients. To the best of our knowledge, this paper 
represents the first attempt in the literature to investigate household’s decision to switch its 
bank, focusing in particular on the features of their relationship, such as the number and type 
of bank services a household uses with the bank and whether it uses other banks. To this end, 
we exploit a unique panel dataset mainly drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW) and spanning the 2006-2012 period. Italy lends itself particularly 
well to this analysis since as much as one out of four households in the sample change their 
(main) bank in the observed period. Additionally, the dataset identifies at each point in time 
the bank(s) chosen by each household and the bank services used. As an example, we are 
able to observe a household which in 2006 uses bank A to manage its payment of utilities 
and, in 2008 uses bank B –  i.e., decides to switch from bank A to bank B – to take out a 
mortgage in addition to (or instead of) its payment of utilities. Complementing this household 
level information with bank level information from BankScope (BS) enables us to relate 
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households’ decision to switch their bank to the features of the household-bank relationship, 
controlling for household, bank and background characteristics (i.e., the features of the 
environment).   
 We find robust evidence that households’ bank switching is strongly associated with 
the household-bank relationship features in terms of exclusivity (using a single bank), 
intensity (number of services used), and scope (bank services used). By looking at the 
dynamics of bank services a household uses over time, we find that both taking out and 
paying off a mortgage increase the likelihood that a household switches its bank. Besides, 
several household characteristics which are traditionally identified as being associated with 
personal financial decisions – household size, marital status, education and financial literacy 
– matter for propensity to switch, whereas no role for the overall economic condition of the 
household is found. Finally, switching is found to be associated with specialization and 
market listing status, being less frequent among the clientele of the unlisted banks and 
cooperative banks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next Section reviews the literature. 
Section 3 formalizes the hypotheses and the estimation strategy; Section 4 describes the 
dataset, defines the variables of interest for the analysis, and provides the descriptive 
statistics; Section 5 presents the empirical findings; Section 6 discusses their robustness; 
finally, Section 7 concludes and formulates some policy recommendations. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Our study lies at the intersection of two main streams of literature, namely banking and 
household finance.  
A well-established literature on bank-firm relationships covers, among other topics, the 
importance of deposit relationships in traditional lending (Hodgman, 1961; Kane and 
Malkiel, 1965; and Santikian, 2014), the relationship duration (Ongena and Smith, 1998, and 
2001), the number of bank relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2000; Farinha and Santos, 2002; 
Detragiache et al., 2000), the uniqueness of bank-firm relationship (Fama, 1985; James, 
1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989), the dynamics of consumer relationship in bank loan 
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market (Sharpe, 1990), the importance of competition in credit markets (Petersen and Rajan, 
1995), and firm's decision to switch bank (Gopalan et al., 2011; Degryse et al., 2011; 
Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010). Our investigation draws from this bank-firm relationship 
literature and adapts the framework to a household-bank relationship. 
There is an increasing body of (positive) household finance literature (see Campbell, 
2006, for an excellent review) that analyses how the households actually take financial 
decisions, relating them to households’ demographic and socio-economic characteristics. 
The decisions investigated cover consumption and saving (see e. g., Browning and Lusardi, 
1996, and the references therein), payment and borrowing, (see Cox and Jappelli, 1990, and 
1993; Crook, 2001; Guiso et al., 2014), various types of insurance (Lin and Grace, 2007; 
Goldman and Maestas, 2013), and especially portfolio choices, concerning both financial 
(Guiso et al., 2002; Guiso and Sodini, 2012) and real assets (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; 
Cocco, 2004; Battu et al., 2008). Remarkably, very few contributions have to date 
investigated the household-bank relationship. The exception is the literature on market 
discipline and bank runs, which focuses on clients’ concern over bank’s (potential) distress 
as a determinant of deposit interest rates, proportion of uninsured deposits, and deposit 
withdrawals (see e. g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Iyer et al., 2013; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002). Yet, in this literature the 
main motivation of a household for leaving its bank is the belief that the bank might fail, and 
thus is the same across all retail clients. By contrast, in this analysis we investigate 
households’ decision to leave their bank focusing primarily on motives within household’s 
needs and preferences rather than their concern over the bank’s potential distress.  
Our study also touches upon the contributions by Kiser (2002), Brown and Hoffmann 
(2013) and Brown et al. (2013). Kiser (2002) empirically investigates the covariates of 
switching costs and decision to switch banks using a sample of 1,500 US households drawn 
from the 1999 Michigan Surveys of Consumers. She looks at the household socio-economic 
observables and self-reported reasons for remaining with the first-ever bank, finding a 
positive and significant role for income, age and especially homeownership, which may have 
induced a "lock-in" effect and guarantee a long-term bank relationship. Brown and Hoffmann 
(2013) and Brown et al. (2013) rely on a telephone-based survey conducted in 2011 by GfK 
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that samples around 1,500 Swiss households. In the former paper, the authors focus on 470 
mortgage holders with multiple bank relationships to compare the mortgage and non-
mortgage relations for the same household. They find that the mortgage relations are used 
within a broader scope of services, are held with the banks geographically closer to the 
household, and are recently established compared to the non-mortgage relations. They also 
document a role of financial literacy, as more literate borrowers are less likely to hold a 
mortgage with a local bank. Brown et al. (2013) focus on the role of the switching costs and 
insurance coverage in mitigating the risk of deposit withdrawals from a large, distressed 
commercial bank in the financial crisis period (2008-2009). They find that the household-
level switching costs lower the propensity to withdraw the deposits from a distressed bank, 
whereas no effect is found for the deposit insurance coverage. 
2.3 Hypotheses and Estimation Strategy 
In this section, we first discuss the main hypotheses to be tested in our empirical 
analysis. The households are expected to be less likely to switch if they face higher switching 
costs and/or have stronger ties to their bank. 
The number of services (capturing the intensity of the relationship) is a well-recognized 
proxy for the costs of switching (see e.g., Brown et al., 2013). Namely, each bank service 
adds up to the total switching costs. Furthermore, the higher the number of services, the more 
difficult is for the household to precisely assess the total cost of switching. Multiple bank 
services used give rise to the economies of scope, thus further discouraging switching. Based 
on this argument, we formalize our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Household’s propensity to switch is decreasing in the number of 
services it uses with the bank.  
To the extent that the multiplicity of bank relationships indicates weaker bank ties, we 
propose our next hypothesis to be tested: 
Hypothesis 2: The households having an exclusive relationship with the bank (i.e., 
using only one bank) are less likely to switch. 
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Finally, we argue that the bank-client relationship evolves over time, with the change 
in household needs for bank services. Switching is more likely when a household makes an 
important financial decision, such as taking out a mortgage, thus our third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3: Taking out a long-term credit is an important motivation for switching. 
 
In order to test our hypotheses and investigate the determinants of bank switching, we 
estimate the following linear probability model:32 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐑𝑖𝑡−1β+ 𝐇𝑖𝑡−1γ+ 𝐁𝑖𝑡−1δ+ 𝐗𝑖𝑡−1θ          (1), 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑡 (Switch) is a binary variable taking value 1 if household i changes its (main) bank 
between t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise. Matrix R contains the main variables of interest, namely 
household-bank relationship characteristics in terms of exclusivity, intensity, and scope. 
Exclusivity refers to having relationship with only one bank, whereas by intensity we refer 
to the number of services the household uses with its main bank. Finally, the scope captures 
the actual nature of the household-bank relationship, i. e. which bank services are used. 
Matrices H and B include households’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics, 
such as household size and income, and bank’s characteristics such as specialization, size 
and performance, respectively. Finally, matrix X includes controls for background, such as 
time and location. This specification allows us to disentangle the effects of household-bank 
relationship characteristics from the potentially confounding factors, such as household and 
bank features, as well as characteristics of the environment, which may all be associated with 
household’s propensity to switch a bank. 
All regressors are lagged one period. This choice is driven by a twofold advantage. 
First, it assures the model predetermination. Using the regressors from t would be correct if 
and only if the switch from one bank to another occurred exactly in t. Yet, while our 
dependent variable Switch captures whether a bank switching occurred at some point in time 
between t-1 and 𝑡, the exact timing of switching is unknown. Thus, the regressors from t 
would introduce a risk of modelling a decision as a function of observables from future point 
                                                          
32 For the ease of interpretation, we report the results of the ordinary least squares analysis. Our results are 
almost identical when we use a probit model instead. 
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in time with respect to the decision itself. Second, this specification enables to investigate 
which are the characteristics of the discarded bank that are positively associated with 
switching, thereby providing more ready-to-use suggestions for the banks aiming to 
strengthen their ties with the households. The model is estimated by ordinary least squares, 
using robust standard errors clustered at the household level. 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Dataset 
The Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) is a biannual 
survey which interviews in each wave a population-representative sample of around 8,000 
Italian households. Half of the interviewed households are the panel households. 33  The 
survey encompasses plenty of information ranging from the basic demographic to various 
economic variables, including detailed information on household-bank relationship(s). We 
are able to use the bank identifier, which enables us the following. First, we can observe 
which bank(s) each household uses in each wave, and, if multiple, which among those is the 
“main bank”.34 Second, following the panel households over time, we are able to timely trace 
which households change their main bank, and thus to construct our dependent variable, 
Switch. Finally, we are able to match the household-level information to detailed bank-level 
information from BankScope (BS) that provides extensive information from bank balance 
sheets and income statements on a yearly basis, as well as the information on bank history, 
specialization and market listing status.  
Our final dataset thus provides rich set of household’s characteristics and 
characteristics of its relationship with the bank, complemented with the information on bank 
                                                          
33 The basic statistical unit in the SHIW is a household, defined as a group of cohabiting people who, regardless 
of their relationships, satisfy their needs by pooling all or part of their incomes. For more information on the 
SHIW sampling and interviewing methodologies, see Bank of Italy (2012). 
34 See next subsection for the exact wording of the SHIW questionnaire. 
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features, representing one of the first attempts in the literature to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the household-bank relationship. 
2.4.2 Variable definitions  
This section describes the variables included in the empirical estimation of model (1). 
The core information on household-bank relationship relies on the following three 
questions from the SHIW. The first concerns which bank(s) the household uses (“Which 
among [the listed banks] do you use?”) and the second which among those is its main bank 
(“Which of [the circled banks] do you use most often?”). The third question relevant for our 
research focuses on the bank services used with the main bank: "Apart from your account, 
what other financial [the listed products/services] of your main bank do you use?". The 
households may indicate one or more among the following: payments of utilities, rent or 
other expenses; mortgage; consumer credit and personal loans; securities custody, 
administration and management; and insurance.  
By means of this information, we construct our dependent variable, Switch, which is 
defined in t as a binary variable taking value 1 if household i changes its main bank between 
wave t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise.35 Since a household may use multiple banks, switching the 
main bank may capture what we refer to as “bank shuffling”. This is the case when the 
previous main bank becomes a secondary bank, or the previous secondary bank starts to be 
used as the main bank – i.e., the bank is used in both periods, but what changes is its reported 
relative frequency of use. We, thus, construct two alternative dependent variables to be used 
as a robustness check: Switch Drop is equal to 1 if a household changes its main bank 
dropping its previous bank (i.e., it does not become its secondary bank), and 0 otherwise, 
                                                          
35 In doing so, we took into account possible restructuring and the associated name changes at the national level. 
During our sample period the Italian market underwent a strong consolidation process, which might undermine 
the correct construction of our dependent variable. For instance, the banks that have changed names between 
two consecutive waves, would have all households counted as “switchers” between wave t-1 and t. To correct 
for this, we do not consider as switching if a household uses a bank that has been involved in a merger or 
acquisition with the household’s previous bank. 
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whereas Switch New is equal to 1 if a household switches to a bank with which it did not 
have any previous relationship (i.e., it does not switch to its secondary bank), and 0 otherwise.  
Based on the same questions we also build the main variables of interest included in 
Matrix R, namely: (i) Exclusivity, a dummy taking value 1 if a household has relationship 
with one bank only, and 0 otherwise; (ii) Intensity (Nr. Total services), a categorical variable 
counting the number of bank services used by a household; and (iii) Scope of the relationship, 
function of bank services used distinguished by type, including Payments (payment of 
utilities, rent or other expenses); Insurance; Mortgage; Consumer credit; Portfolio 
management and Other services (besides the ones listed above). 
Exploiting the panel dimension of our dataset, we are also able to observe the change 
in the bank services used with the main bank over time, thus capturing the change in the 
scope of a household-bank relationship. Specifically, for each bank service, we construct two 
dummy variables. The first dummy (Add [Specific service]) takes value of 1 when the 
household does not use that service in t-1 but uses it in t, whereas the second dummy (Drop 
[Specific service]) takes value of 1 when the household uses that service in t-1, but no longer 
uses it in t.36 This specification enables us to relate household’s decision to switch its main 
bank to a change in the bank services that a household requires. 
In line with the literature on household finance, matrix H includes standard socio-
economic and demographic controls. Namely, we control for household size, as well as age, 
gender, marital status, education, financial literacy and risk aversion of the household head.37 
Age is controlled for both in linear and quadratic terms, and gender and marital status by 
means of two dummies for being Male and Married, respectively. Education is controlled for 
with two dummies for the highest education level achieved, being secondary school or 
college (Medium education) and graduate or post-graduate level (High education), 
respectively. 
                                                          
36 We refer to the services used with the main bank, as we do not have information on the services used with 
the secondary bank(s), if any. 
37 The head of the household in the SHIW is defined as the person in charge of taking the economic and financial 
choices of the household. 
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The questions included in the SHIW financial literacy test vary slightly from wave to 
wave, thus we focus on the two questions common to all the waves in our sample: one 
referring to the mortgage types, whereas the other tests the comprehension of the real interest 
rates. On mortgages, the respondent is asked to indicate the type of mortgage (fixed rate, 
adjustable rate, or adjustable rate with fixed instalments) involving a fixed (in advance) 
number and amount of instalments to repay the debt. On real interest rates, respondent is 
asked to indicate the amount of goods he/she can buy (the same, less, or more) at the end of 
the year if he/she leaves 1,000 euro in a bank account, for a year, at an annual interest rate of 
1% in nominal terms, when annual inflation is 2%. Accordingly, to control for household 
head’s financial sophistication, we generate two dummies: one for providing the correct 
answer to only one question out of two (Intermediate financial literacy), and one for 
answering both questions correctly (Good financial literacy).  
The survey also provides a self-reported measure of risk aversion, as the household 
head is asked to indicate the preferred investment profile among four types, ranging from 1 
(high risk, high returns) to 4 (no risk, low returns). Our model specification includes a dummy 
taking value 1 if the preferred investment profile is the fourth (Risk-averse). The overall 
economic condition of the household is captured by Disposable income and Net wealth, both 
in quintiles. Additionally, we control for household head’s main professional occupation, 
including dummies for being Employee or Self-employed, thereby setting the “non-working” 
(looking for a job, retired, students, housewives, etc.) as the reference category. Finally, 
mobility of the household is controlled for by means of two dummies: one for having changed 
municipality of residence between t-1 and t (Moved), and one for owning the residential 
house (Homeowner).  
We also include a rich set of bank-level controls (corresponding to matrix B in model 
1), such as bank specialization, size, performance, market listing, and recent involvement in 
a merger or an acquisition. Bank specialization is controlled for by means of two dummies 
for the bank being Cooperative or Savings, with Commercial banks being the reference 
category. Bank size is captured by the bank total assets (Size), whereas we also control for 
the bank profitability (Return on Assets – ROA) and leverage (Equity over Total asset). We 
also include a dummy for bank being Listed on the stock market and a dummy for M&A 
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involvement that takes value of 1 if the bank was involved in M&A process between t-1 and 
t, and 0 otherwise. 
In matrix X we include various background controls: macro-region (North-East, North-
West, Centre and South) and time dummies, as well as the size of the city of residence as a 
proxy for bank competition.  
For a detailed definition of all the variables used in the analysis see Table A1. 
2.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The estimation sample covers the 2006-2012 period and consists of an unbalanced 
panel of 3,128 unique households, for a total of 5,081 household-year observations.38  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the estimation sample. Around one out of four 
households in our sample changes its main bank (Switch). This ratio is multi-fold higher than 
a natural run-off rate of stable deposits which is 5% by BIS guidelines (BIS, 2013). These 
descriptive statistics are almost identical to Switch New and Switch Drop, which indicates 
that “bank shuffling” is not prevalent, i.e., the households who change their main bank close 
their accounts and switch to a bank that they haven’t used before. This is a striking result if 
we think of a well-documented phenomenon of inertia that characterizes household choices 
(see e. g., Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). 
As for the household-bank relationship, 80% of the households have only one bank 
(Exclusivity) and the median household uses only one service in addition to a bank account 
(Nr. Total services). Changes in the services are the most frequent for payments (around 6% 
of households in the sample add this service and 11% drop it), mortgages (around 6% add it 
and 6% drop it) and portfolio management (7% add and 8% leave it). 
                                                          
38 We exclude the households with the household head aged over 91 or below 19, as well as the households 
which possess neither financial nor real assets, or that report negative total consumption. We also drop the 
households who use a post office (around 15% of the initial sample) or who report using a bank for which we 
do not have information in Bankscope. 
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The median household counts 2 household members. The median household head is 
male, married, 54 years old and has completed a secondary school or college (Medium 
Education). As for the financial literacy, 33% of the respondents answered correctly one of 
the questions testing financial sophistication (Intermediate Financial Literacy), whereas 58% 
answered both questions correctly (Good Financial Literacy). The average risk aversion in 
our sample is 3.2 on 1 to 4 scale, where 1 represents risk-lover and 4 risk-averse profile (42% 
are Risk-averse). Around 41% of household heads are employee, 17% are self-employed, 
whereas the rest are not working. 
A household has median annual disposable income of slightly more than €36,000 and 
net wealth of around €229,000. When it comes to the homeownership, around 76% of the 
households in our estimation sample own their residential home, whereas only 2% of the 
households moved from one municipality to another between two waves, suggesting that 
mobility of the households in our sample is quite low. Majority of the households (84%) use 
a commercial bank as their main bank, 7% of the households use a savings bank, whereas 
9% use a cooperative bank.  
Our sample includes 84 unique banks, 53 of which are commercial, 16 savings, and 15 
cooperative banks. These banks are representative of the Italian banking industry, as they 
account for 97% of the total assets in the market. These shares are 52%, and 43% for 
cooperative and savings banks respectively. 
The descriptive statistics for the bank-year observations are reported in Table 2. 
Around 26% of the banks are listed. In terms of total assets, which we use as a proxy for size, 
the median bank has 11.84 billion euros. Notably, the median size of the cooperative banks 
is quite similar to those of the commercial ones and very much aligned to the overall average 
bank size, indicating that bank size in our sample is not necessarily associated to the bank 
specialization. We also report measures of the bank profitability and its funding structure, 
Equity/Total assets and Return on Assets (ROA) respectively, in order to disentangle the role 
of the bank’s specialization for household’s decision to switch a bank. 
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2.5 Results  
Table 3 reports the estimation output of the first empirical counterpart of equation (1), 
varying the set of controls. In Panel A, the intensity of the relationship is captured by the 
number of bank services used by the household in t-1, whereas Panel B provides a services-
type break-down.  
For ease of the exposition and to disentangle the determinants of bank switching, we 
start in column (1) by including our main variables of interest (in R) and baseline controls 
only (municipality size dummies, region fixed effects and time fixed effects). In Column (2) 
we include in the estimation a set of household controls, in Column (3) we include a set of 
bank controls, whereas in Column (4) we include both the household and the bank controls. 
The results in Panel A and Panel B show that, consistently with the hypothesis 2, having 
a relationship exclusively with one bank (Exclusivity) reduces the probability of switching 
by 8-9%. The effect of the number of services (Nr. Total Services) goes in the same direction, 
as reported in Panel A, thus supporting our hypothesis 1: for each additional service used at 
the main bank, the household is around 4% less likely to switch. In order to further investigate 
this issue, Panel B provides a service-type break-down. The results show that the effect is 
mainly driven by Payments, Consumer credit and portfolio management (Portfolio mgmt.), 
suggesting that these are the services which make the households in our sample more likely 
to stick to their bank. On the other hand, Mortgage and Insurance seem to form a weak tie 
of clients to their banks. This heterogeneity of “stickiness” across various banks services is 
related to the variation in the switching costs that each service entails. Changing the bank 
used for payments purposes implies informing all third parties associated with the service of 
the changed account number, whereas changing the portfolio management provider often 
implies untimely liquidation of the assets. The consumer credit is of lower debt burden and 
usually shorter maturity than a mortgage, thus the potential benefits of migrating a consumer 
credit to another bank are small, whereas the opposite is true for a mortgage loan. Changing 
insurance provider rarely entails a cost for a household. 
For the household controls, Table 3 - columns (2) and (4) - shows that Household size 
slightly increases the probability of changing a bank, whereas Age does not affect it. The 
estimated effect of the marital status goes in the expected direction: the households with a 
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Married household head are less prone to change their bank. The rationale stems from the 
intra-household bargaining process, since for a couple to switch the two partners need to 
converge on the decision.39 An interesting finding is that whereas education has a positive 
gradient, a higher level of financial literacy is strongly and negatively associated with the 
bank switching. This result suggests that the households with better financial comprehension 
are more able to choose the bank that better fits their needs in the first place, thus are less 
likely to need to change the bank in the future. Based on our evidence, gender, working status 
and risk aversion do not play a determinant role for switching, and, interestingly, even income 
and wealth do not affect this decision. Additionally, both proxies for mobility - namely, being 
homeowner and having moved - do not seem to matter. To sum up, the household 
characteristics that shape the bank-switching decision are household size, marital status, 
education and financial literacy, rather than the mobility or the overall economic condition 
of the household. 
As for the bank's characteristics, columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 show that neither 
having undergone a merger & acquisition (M&A) process nor bank’s performance (measured 
by ROA and Equity/Total assets) play a role in households’ decision to remain with the bank. 
On the other hand, the bank specialization is important. The estimates show that the 
cooperative banks are considerably less likely (around 10%) to be discarded with respect to 
the commercial banks, whereas this is not true for the savings banks. Since we are controlling 
for bank’s size and performance (the “hard” characteristics of a bank), the cooperative 
dummy captures a “soft” differentiation with respect to the commercial banks, which is 
primarily the difference in the value a bank attaches to its retail clients. Namely, the retails 
clients are at the centre of cooperative banks’ business model, thus resulting in the close ties 
of a household to its bank. Finally, the households are more prone to leave a listed bank, 
which may be ascribed to a more profit-oriented management of these banks.  
                                                          
39 Our starting point is the collective household model, in which the final decision of the household is the result 
of bargaining among all household members, as opposed to the unitary model, in which the breadwinner only 
takes all decisions. More on this issue e. g. in Bertocchi et al. (2014) and references therein.   
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Table 4 reports the estimation output of the second empirical counterpart of equation 
(1), in which we take into account the dynamics of the household-bank relationship via a set 
of dummies (Add and Drop) capturing the changes in a specific service used by the 
household. 
The evidence referring to the Exclusivity and to the Intensity are confirmed. Yet, new 
insights can be obtained on the service-driven switching. Consistent with the hypothesis 3, 
we find that the households opening a mortgage are 15% (Add mortgage) more likely to 
switch a bank. However, closing a mortgage (Drop mortgage) also increases the probability 
of switching by 13%. According to this evidence, in our sample households’ choice of a bank 
is strongly driven by the offered mortgage terms, but the chosen bank faces a challenge to 
retain them after the mortgage has been paid off. This is not surprising considering that 
among all bank services, the mortgages are those for which the households are more able to 
assess the total cost, given by the interest rate, and, thus, the advantages of switching a bank. 
One might argue that the same holds for the consumer credit, yet, the mortgages are 
associated with the purchase of a house, which is typically one of the most important 
investment decisions in a household’s life-cycle, therefore entailing a higher level of due 
diligence that the households exercise. 
The time dummies, not shown in Tables 3 and 4 for reasons of space, suggest a 
decreasing trend in the probability to change a bank relative to 2008. 
2.6 Robustness 
All results presented in the previous section are robust to the alternative specifications 
of both the dependent variable and several controls.  
2.6.1 Dependent variable 
With our dependent variable, we aim to capture household’s decision to change its 
bank. We, thus, define our baseline dependent variable Switch as being 1 if a household 
changes its main bank between waves t-1 and t. While definition of switching is 
straightforward for the households using only one bank and switching to another single bank 
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relationship, for the households using multiple banks our measure of switching may capture 
what we refer to as “bank shuffling”. These concerns are mitigated by the peculiarity of our 
sample in which the majority of households use only one bank. However, to address this 
issue explicitly, we test the robustness of our results to more restrictive measures of 
switching, Switch New and Switch Drop, as defined in section 2.4.2. The results are reported 
in Tables 5 to 8 and are qualitatively similar to those obtained in Tables 3 and 4. 
2.6.2 Control variables 
In the specifications reported in Table 9 and Table 10 we use two alternative measures 
to Exclusivity to capture household’s loyalty to its main bank, namely the number of banks 
used by the household (Nr. Banks) and a dummy taking value 1 if a household has been using 
its main bank for 10 years or more (Long-lasting relationship).40 In both tables, the former 
shows a positive marginal effect suggesting that for each additional bank used, a household 
is around 6% more likely to change its main bank. Similarly in Table 10, the households who 
have been using their main bank since a long ago are 11% less likely to replace it with another 
bank. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper empirically investigates the household’s decision to change its main bank, 
a timely issue considering the increasing attention devoted to it by the practitioners and the 
policy makers.  
To this end, we rely on a dataset which is unique on several grounds. First, it observes 
households and their bank(s) over time, providing ample information about the bank services 
used. This means that households' decision to switch or stay is timely observed, rather than 
inferred based on retrospective or question on intention to switch, and can be related to the 
bank services used. Second, the dataset relies on a survey which is representative of the entire 
population. Third, it refers to the 2006-2012 period and to the Italian market, which 
particularly lends itself to this analysis since: (i) as much as one out of four of the households 
                                                          
40 According to Table 1, majority of the households use one bank only and have been with their main bank for 
over 10 years. 
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do change their main bank; and (ii) it is highly representative of the Italian bank market, 
enabling us to gauge the differences in switching vulnerability of different types of banks. 
We find that, even after controlling for household's and bank's characteristics, the households 
are more reluctant to switch if they have an exclusive, long-lasting relationship with their 
bank, and/or use the bank more intensely. Specifically, a household having an exclusive 
relationship with the bank (or using the bank for longer than 10 years) is about 9-10% less 
likely to switch, whereas for each additional service used, the probability of switching a bank 
reduces by 4%. The latter result confirms the role of switching costs as discussed in the 
literature. Finally, the scope of the relationship also matters since long-term credit services 
(a mortgage) are found to be a strong driver of household's decision to switch its bank, both 
when taking it out and having paid it off. These results suggest that households’ choice of a 
bank is strongly driven by the offered mortgage terms, but also that a chosen bank faces a 
challenge in retaining the clients after the mortgage has been paid off.  
We also find that household size, marital status, education and financial literacy are 
associated with the decision to change bank, whereas mobility and the overall economic 
condition of the household are not. Some of the characteristics of the discarded bank also 
matter, with the cooperative banks being significantly less likely to be abandoned. This result 
frames into the recently increasing attention devoted to the cooperative banks from 
academics, politicians and the public, who have wondered whether their specific 
characteristics have provided them with a safer shelter against the propagation of the global 
financial crisis. 
Our result that the cooperative banks are significantly less likely to be discarded, may 
serve as a recommendation to the policy makers. So far, Basel III liquidity requirements 
strongly discriminate between "stable" and "unstable" customer deposits. More specifically, 
the regulators assume that customer deposits which are embedded in a well-established bank-
client relationship are less subject to the withdrawal risk, thereby shaping liquidity 
requirements based on the intensity of the relationship. According to our evidence, we can 
add that liquidity requirements should evaluate the stability of the relationship not only based 
on its intensity but also based on the bank's specialization.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on estimation sample (household level) 
Dependent variables Obs Mean Median Min Max St.Dev. 
Full sample       
Switch 5,081 0.23 0 0 1 0.42 
Switch New 5,081 0.22 0 0 1 0.41 
Switch Drop 5,081 0.22 0 0 1 0.41 
Control variables       
 Obs Mean Median Min Max St.Dev. 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics 
Exclusivity 5,081 0.80 1 0 1 0.40 
Nr. Banks 5,081 1.24 1 1 5 0.50 
Long-lasting relationship 4,166 0.65 1 0 1 0.48 
Nr. Total services 5,081 1.37 1 0 5 0.76 
Payments 5,081 0.90 1 0 1 0.30 
Insurance 5,081 0.04 0 0 1 0.19 
Mortgage 5,081 0.15 0 0 1 0.36 
Consumer credit 5,081 0.04 0 0 1 0.20 
Portfolio mgmt. 5,081 0.20 0 0 1 0.40 
Other services 5,081 0.04 0 0 1 0.21 
Add payments 5,081 0.06 0 0 1 0.23 
Add insurance 5,081 0.02 0 0 1 0.14 
Add mortgage 5,081 0.06 0 0 1 0.23 
Add consumer credit 5,081 0.04 0 0 1 0.21 
Add portfolio mgmt. 5,081 0.07 0 0 1 0.26 
Add other services 5,081 0.05 0 0 1 0.21 
Drop payments 5,081 0.11 0 0 1 0.32 
Drop insurance 5,081 0.02 0 0 1 0.15 
Drop mortgage 5,081 0.06 0 0 1 0.23 
Drop consumer credit 5,081 0.03 0 0 1 0.16 
Drop portfolio mgmt. 5,081 0.08 0 0 1 0.26 
Drop other services 5,081 0.03 0 0 1 0.18 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on estimation sample (ctd.) 
 Obs Mean Median Min Max St.Dev. 
H: Household characteristics 
Household size 5,081 2.63 2 1 8 1.24 
Age  5,081 54.31 54 20 90 14.33 
Male  5,081 0.66 1 0 1 0.47 
Married  5,081 0.69 1 0 1 0.46 
Education  5,081 3.47 3 1 6 0.99 
Medium education  5,081 0.69 1 0 1 0.46 
High education  5,081 0.14 0 0 1 0.35 
Financial literacy 5,081 1.48 2 0 2 0.67 
Intermediate financial 
literacy 5,081 0.33 0 0 1 0.47 
Good financial literacy  5,081 0.58 1 0 1 0.49 
Risk-aversion  5,081 3.24 3 1 4 0.76 
Risk-averse 5,081 0.42 0 0 1 0.49 
Moved  5,081 0.02 0 0 1 0.14 
Homeowner  5,081 0.76 1 0 1 0.43 
Employee  5,081 0.41 0 0 1 0.49 
Self-employed  5,081 0.17 0 0 1 0.38 
Income (€1,000) 5,081 43.01 36.24 0 427.95 28.37 
Net wealth (€1,000)  5,081 356.50 229.13 -875.42 30,934 745.74 
B: Bank characteristics 
Commercial  5,081 0.84 1 0 1 0.37 
Savings  5,081 0.07 0 0 1 0.25 
Cooperative  5,081 0.09 0 0 1 0.29 
Size (in logs) 5,081 11.04 11.09 7.92 13.95 1.42 
ROA 5,081 0.67 0.78 -1.4 2.36 0.46 
Equity/Total assets 5,081 7.08 6.88 2.35 25.21 2.84 
Listed 5,081 0.41 0 0 1 0.49 
M&A 5,081 0.13 0 0 1 0.33 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics at the bank level 
Variable Obs Mean Median Min Max St.Dev. 
Commercial 238 0.61 1 0 1 0.49 
Savings 238 0.21 0 0 1 0.41 
Coop 238 0.18 0 0 1 0.39 
Listed 238 0.26 0 0 1 0.44 
Total assets (billions euro) 238 50.76 11.84 2.39 1,142.03 153.19 
-Commercial 146 71.2 14.92 2.76 1,142.03 192.15 
-Savings 49 11.29 5.67 2.39 50.8 11.75 
-Cooperative 43 26.32 11.89 2.81 135.79 30.18 
Return on Assets (ROA) % 238 0.41 0.47 -6.7 2.36 0.77 
-Commercial 146 0.42 0.52 -6.7 2.36 0.91 
-Savings 49 0.34 0.40 -1 1.43 0.55 
-Cooperative 43 0.45 0.46 -1.17 1.07 0.40 
Equity/Total assets % 238 7.85 7.48 1.44 25.21 3.09 
-Commercial 146 7.63 7.00 1.44 25.21 3.54 
-Savings 49 7.47 7.20 3.76 11.93 1.61 
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Table 3: Probability to switch, main specification. 
Panel A 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics     
Exclusivity -0.081*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.087*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Nr. Total services -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.037*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
H: Household controls     
Household size   0.019*  0.020** 
   (0.010)  (0.010) 
Age   0.004  0.003 
   (0.005)  (0.004) 
Age2  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Male  -0.018  -0.010 
   (0.021)  (0.021) 
Married  -0.071***  -0.075*** 
   (0.027)  (0.027) 
Medium education   0.087***  0.087*** 
   (0.024)  (0.024) 
High education   0.098***  0.096*** 
   (0.035)  (0.035) 
Intermediate fin.lit.  -0.082***  -0.079** 
   (0.032)  (0.032) 
Good fin.lit.  -0.114***  -0.111*** 
   (0.031)  (0.030) 
Risk-averse  -0.015  -0.014 
   (0.016)  (0.016) 
Moved   -0.060  -0.062 
   (0.051)  (0.052) 
Homeowner  -0.003  -0.009 
   (0.028)  (0.028) 
Employee  -0.003  -0.006 
   (0.025)  (0.025) 
Self-employed  -0.020  -0.015 
   (0.032)  (0.032) 
Income – Q2  0.012  0.006 
   (0.040)  (0.040) 
Income – Q3  0.008  0.002 
   (0.039)  (0.038) 
Income – Q4  0.011  0.008 
   (0.040)  (0.040) 
Income – Q5  0.038  0.032 
   (0.044)  (0.044) 
Net Wealth – Q2  0.015  0.021 
   (0.035)  (0.035) 
Net Wealth – Q3  0.041  0.045 
   (0.042)  (0.041) 
Net Wealth – Q4  0.026  0.027 
   (0.041)  (0.041) 
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Table 3 – Panel A (continued)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net Wealth – Q5  -0.041  -0.036 
  (0.044)  (0.043) 
B: Bank controls     
Cooperative    -0.105*** -0.098*** 
    (0.027) (0.027) 
Savings    0.003 -0.003 
    (0.034) (0.034) 
Size (in logs)   0.014* 0.014* 
    (0.008) (0.008) 
Listed   0.086*** 0.081*** 
   (0.023) (0.022) 
ROA   -0.002 0.003 
    (0.023) (0.023) 
Equity/Total assets   0.003 0.004 
    (0.004) (0.003) 
M&A   0.009 0.009 
   (0.026) (0.026) 
Macro_Regions controls YES YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,081 5,081 5,081 5,081 
R-squared 0.027 0.047 0.047 0.066 
Robust standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the household level. All regressions are estimated 
using ordinary least squares and the sample weights. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 (continued): Probability to switch, main specification. 
Panel B 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics     
Exclusivity -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.085*** -0.086*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Payments  -0.076** -0.072** -0.072** -0.067** 
  (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
Insurance -0.052 -0.041 -0.045 -0.035 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Mortgage -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Consumer credit -0.070** -0.078** -0.086** -0.092*** 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Portfolio mgmt.  -0.049** -0.040* -0.058*** -0.049** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Other services 0.039 0.049 0.036 0.045 
  (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
H: Household controls     
Household size   0.019*  0.020** 
   (0.010)  (0.010) 
Age   0.004  0.004 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Age2  -0.004  -0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Male  -0.016  -0.008 
   (0.021)  (0.021) 
Married  -0.074***  -0.079*** 
   (0.027)  (0.026) 
Medium education   0.088***  0.088*** 
   (0.024)  (0.024) 
High education   0.099***  0.098*** 
   (0.035)  (0.035) 
Intermediate fin.lit.  -0.077**  -0.074** 
   (0.031)  (0.031) 
Good fin.lit.  -0.110***  -0.107*** 
   (0.030)  (0.030) 
Risk-averse  -0.015  -0.014 
   (0.016)  (0.016) 
Moved   -0.064  -0.067 
   (0.051)  (0.052) 
Homeowner  -0.012  -0.019 
   (0.028)  (0.028) 
Employee  -0.003  -0.006 
   (0.025)  (0.025) 
Self-employed  -0.027  -0.022 
   (0.033)  (0.032) 
Income – Q2  0.017  0.011 
   (0.040)  (0.039) 
Income – Q3  0.013  0.006 
   (0.039)  (0.038) 
Income – Q4  0.019  0.015 
   (0.040)  (0.039) 
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Table 3 – Panel B (continued)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income – Q5  0.047  0.039 
   (0.044)  (0.044) 
Net Wealth – Q2  0.013  0.020 
   (0.035)  (0.035) 
Net Wealth – Q3  0.041  0.048 
   (0.042)  (0.041) 
Net Wealth – Q4  0.032  0.035 
   (0.042)  (0.041) 
Net Wealth – Q5  -0.036  -0.028 
  (0.044)  (0.044) 
B: Bank controls     
Cooperative    -0.108*** -0.101*** 
    (0.028) (0.027) 
Savings    -0.000 -0.006 
    (0.034) (0.034) 
Size (in logs)   0.013* 0.014* 
    (0.008) (0.008) 
Listed   0.088*** 0.082*** 
   (0.023) (0.023) 
ROA   -0.001 0.004 
    (0.023) (0.023) 
Equity/Total assets   0.003 0.004 
    (0.004) (0.003) 
M&A   0.009 0.009 
   (0.027) (0.026) 
Macro_Regions controls YES YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls YES YES YES YES 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,081 5,081 5,081 5,081 
R-squared 0.030 0.050 0.050 0.070 
Robust standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the household level. All regressions are estimated 
using ordinary least squares and the sample weights. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Probability to switch, change services specification 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics     
Exclusivity -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.083*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Nr. Total services -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.046*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Add payments 0.075* 0.074* 0.074* 0.073* 
  (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040) 
Drop payments -0.004 0.003 -0.010 -0.004 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Add insurance -0.038 -0.024 -0.047 -0.034 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) 
Drop insurance 0.019 0.022 0.027 0.029 
  (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) 
Add mortgage 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Drop mortgage 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
Add consumer credit -0.008 -0.007 -0.014 -0.014 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
Drop consumer credit -0.021 -0.030 -0.036 -0.045 
  (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) 
Add portfolio mgmt. -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Drop portfolio mgmt. 0.036 0.040 0.035 0.037 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Add other -0.035 -0.029 -0.039 -0.033 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
Drop other 0.082 0.086 0.082 0.084 
  (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) 
H: Household controls     
Household size   0.018*  0.019** 
   (0.010)  (0.010) 
Age   0.004  0.003 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Age2  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Male  -0.021  -0.012 
   (0.021)  (0.021) 
Married  -0.074***  -0.079*** 
   (0.027)  (0.026) 
Medium education   0.088***  0.088*** 
   (0.024)  (0.023) 
High education   0.098***  0.096*** 
   (0.035)  (0.034) 
Intermediate fin.lit.  -0.072**  -0.069** 
   (0.031)  (0.031) 
Good fin.lit.  -0.106***  -0.102*** 
   (0.030)  (0.030) 
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Table 4 (continued)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk-averse  -0.015  -0.014 
   (0.016)  (0.016) 
Moved   -0.066  -0.068 
   (0.051)  (0.052) 
Homeowner  -0.013  -0.020 
   (0.028)  (0.028) 
Employee  -0.008  -0.012 
   (0.025)  (0.025) 
Self-employed  -0.034  -0.028 
   (0.033)  (0.032) 
Income – Q2  0.020  0.015 
   (0.040)  (0.039) 
Income – Q3  0.016  0.010 
   (0.039)  (0.038) 
Income – Q4  0.018  0.015 
   (0.040)  (0.040) 
Income – Q5  0.047  0.040 
   (0.044)  (0.044) 
Net Wealth – Q2  0.012  0.018 
   (0.035)  (0.035) 
Net Wealth – Q3  0.038  0.043 
   (0.042)  (0.041) 
Net Wealth – Q4  0.029  0.030 
   (0.041)  (0.041) 
Net Wealth – Q5  -0.039  -0.033 
  (0.044)  (0.043) 
B: Bank controls     
Cooperative    -0.112*** -0.104*** 
    (0.028) (0.027) 
Savings    0.003 -0.003 
    (0.034) (0.034) 
Size (in logs)   0.013 0.014* 
    (0.008) (0.008) 
Listed   0.090*** 0.084*** 
   (0.023) (0.022) 
ROA   -0.003 0.003 
    (0.024) (0.023) 
Equity/Total assets   0.003 0.004 
    (0.004) (0.003) 
M&A   0.004 0.004 
   (0.026) (0.026) 
Macro_Regions controls YES YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,081 5,081 5,081 5,081 
R-squared 0.040 0.061 0.062 0.081 
Robust standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the household level. All regressions are estimated using 
ordinary least squares and the sample weights. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.   
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  Table 5: Robustness: Switch New as dependent, main specification. 
  (1) (2)     (1) ctd (2) ctd 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics   H: Household controls (ctd) 
Exclusivity -0.030 -0.029   Married -0.078*** -0.081*** 
  (0.021) (0.021)     (0.026) (0.026) 
Nr. Total services  -0.036***    Medium education  0.081*** 0.081*** 
  (0.011)      (0.023) (0.023) 
Payments   -0.070**   High education  0.098*** 0.098*** 
   (0.030)     (0.034) (0.034) 
Insurance  -0.024   Intermediate fin.lit. -0.063** -0.058* 
   (0.036)     (0.031) (0.031) 
Mortgage  -0.011   Good fin.lit. -0.098*** -0.094*** 
   (0.024)     (0.030) (0.030) 
Consumer credit  -0.092***   Risk-averse -0.012 -0.012 
   (0.033)     (0.016) (0.016) 
Portfolio mgmt.   -0.036*   Moved  -0.060 -0.064 
   (0.022)     (0.051) (0.051) 
Other services  0.023   Homeowner -0.014 -0.021 
   (0.043)     (0.027) (0.027) 
B: Bank controls      Employee -0.016 -0.016 
Cooperative  -0.088*** -0.090***     (0.025) (0.025) 
  (0.026) (0.027)   Self-employed -0.008 -0.013 
Savings  0.001 0.001     (0.031) (0.031) 
  (0.034) (0.034)   Income – Q2 0.004 0.009 
Size (in logs) 0.015** 0.015**     (0.040) (0.039) 
  (0.008) (0.008)   Income – Q3 0.002 0.007 
Listed 0.077*** 0.077***     (0.038) (0.038) 
 (0.022) (0.022)   Income – Q4 0.008 0.014 
ROA 0.003 0.003     (0.039) (0.039) 
  (0.022) (0.022)   Income – Q5 0.027 0.034 
Equity/Total assets 0.004 0.003     (0.044) (0.043) 
  (0.004) (0.003)   Net Wealth – Q2 0.020 0.018 
M&A 0.009 0.009     (0.035) (0.035) 
 (0.026) (0.026)   Net Wealth – Q3 0.049 0.049 
H: Household controls      (0.041) (0.041) 
Household size  0.021** 0.021**   Net Wealth – Q4 0.027  0.031  
  (0.010) (0.010)     (0.040) (0.041) 
Age  0.003 0.004   Net Wealth – Q5 -0.034  -0.031  
  (0.004) (0.004)     (0.043) (0.043) 
Age2 -0.003 -0.003      
  (0.004) (0.004)      
Male -0.014 -0.014      
  (0.020) (0.020)      
     Observations 5,081 5,081 
     Pseudo-R2 0.062 0.065 
Switch New used as dependent variable in alternative to Switch. All regression specifications include matrix X 
(dummies for time and area of residence, municipality size dummies), that are omitted due to space 
considerations.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Robustness: Switch New as dependent, change services specification. 
 (1)   (1) ctd 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics  H: Household controls (2)  
Exclusivity -0.027  Household size 0.021** 
  (0.021)    (0.010) 
Nr. Total services  -0.040**  Age 0.003 
  (0.016)    (0.004) 
Add payments 0.081**  Age2 -0.003 
  (0.040)    (0.004) 
Drop payments -0.014  Male -0.017 
  (0.025)   (0.020) 
Add insurance -0.031  Married -0.081*** 
  (0.048)   (0.026) 
Drop insurance 0.033  Medium education  0.081*** 
  (0.049)    (0.023) 
Add mortgage 0.134***  High education  0.096*** 
  (0.040)    (0.034) 
Drop mortgage 0.108***  Intermediate fin.lit. -0.053* 
  (0.037)    (0.030) 
Add consumer credit -0.017  Good fin.lit. -0.090*** 
  (0.037)    (0.030) 
Drop consumer credit -0.043  Risk -averse -0.012 
  (0.047)    (0.016) 
Add portfolio mgmt. 0.002  Moved  -0.065 
  (0.030)    (0.051) 
Drop portfolio mgmt. 0.037  Homeowner -0.023 
  (0.029)    (0.027) 
Add other -0.029  Employee  -0.021 
  (0.030)   (0.024) 
Drop other 0.049  Self-employed -0.020 
  (0.049)    (0.031) 
B: Bank controls   Income – Q2 0.011 
Cooperative  -0.093***   (0.039)  
  (0.027)  Income – Q3 0.009 
Savings  0.003    (0.038) 
  (0.034)  Income – Q4 0.013 
Size (in logs) 0.015*   (0.039) 
  (0.008)  Income – Q5 0.033 
ROA 0.079***    (0.043) 
  (0.022)  Net Wealth – Q2 0.017 
Equity/Total assets 0.002    (0.035) 
  (0.022)  Net Wealth – Q3 0.045 
Listed 0.003   (0.040) 
  (0.003)  Net Wealth – Q4 0.028 
M&A 0.005   (0.040) 
  (0.025)  Net Wealth – Q5 -0.034 
    (0.043) 
   Observations 5,081 
   Pseudo-R2 0.074 
Switch New used as dependent variable in alternative to Switch. All regression specifications include 
matrix X (dummies for time and area of residence, municipality size dummies), that are omitted due to 
space considerations.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Robustness: Switch Drop as dependent, main specification. 
  (1) (2)     (1) ctd (2) ctd 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics   H: Household controls (ctd) 
Exclusivity -0.033 -0.032   Married -0.068*** -0.071*** 
  (0.021) (0.021)     (0.025) (0.025) 
Nr. Total services  -0.035***    Medium education  0.080*** 0.081*** 
  (0.011)      (0.023) (0.023) 
Payments   -0.068**   High education  0.088*** 0.089*** 
   (0.030)     (0.034) (0.034) 
Insurance  -0.021   Intermediate fin.lit. -0.069** -0.064** 
   (0.036)     (0.031) (0.031) 
Mortgage  -0.009   Good fin.lit. -0.105*** -0.101*** 
   (0.023)     (0.030) (0.030) 
Consumer credit  -0.092***   Risk-averse -0.010 -0.011 
   (0.033)     (0.016) (0.016) 
Portfolio mgmt.   -0.043**   Moved  -0.054 -0.058 
   (0.021)     (0.052) (0.051) 
Other services  0.048   Homeowner -0.012 -0.020 
   (0.043)     (0.027) (0.027) 
B: Bank controls      Employee 0.012 0.013 
Cooperative  -0.094*** -0.096***     (0.024) (0.024) 
  (0.025) (0.026)   Self-employed 0.004 -0.003 
Savings  0.004 0.001     (0.031) (0.031) 
  (0.034) (0.034)   Income – Q2 -0.000 0.005 
Size (in logs) 0.017** 0.017**     (0.040) (0.039) 
  (0.008) (0.008)   Income – Q3 -0.000 0.004 
Listed 0.065*** 0.065***     (0.038) (0.038) 
 (0.022) (0.022)   Income – Q4 -0.001 0.006 
ROA -0.002 -0.001     (0.039) (0.039) 
  (0.022) (0.022)   Income – Q5 0.022 0.029 
Equity/Total assets 0.005 0.005     (0.043) (0.043) 
  (0.004) (0.003)   Net Wealth – Q2 0.024 0.023 
M&A 0.006 0.006     (0.035) (0.035) 
 (0.025) (0.025)   Net Wealth – Q3 0.044 0.045 
H: Household controls      (0.040) (0.041) 
Household size  0.017* 0.017*   Net Wealth – Q4 0.037 0.043 
  (0.010) (0.010)     (0.040) (0.040) 
Age  0.003 0.003   Net Wealth – Q5 -0.029 -0.024 
  (0.004) (0.004)     (0.042) (0.043) 
Age2 -0.002 -0.002      
  (0.004) (0.004)      
Male -0.018 -0.017      
  (0.020) (0.020)      
     Observations 5,081 5,081 
     Pseudo-R2 0.061 0.065 
Switch Drop used as dependent variable in alternative to Switch. All regression specifications include matrix X 
(dummies for time and area of residence, municipality size dummies), that are omitted due to space 
considerations.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8: Robustness: Switch Drop as dependent, change services specification. 
 (1)   (1) ctd 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics  H: Household controls (2)  
Exclusivity -0.029  Household size 0.017* 
  (0.021)    (0.010) 
Nr. Total services  -0.046***  Age 0.003 
  (0.015)    (0.004) 
Add payments 0.070*  Age2 -0.002 
  (0.040)    (0.004) 
Drop payments -0.011  Male -0.020 
  (0.026)   (0.020) 
Add insurance -0.021  Married -0.071*** 
  (0.048)   (0.025) 
Drop insurance 0.048  Medium education  0.081*** 
  (0.049)    (0.023) 
Add mortgage 0.135***  High education  0.088*** 
  (0.040)    (0.033) 
Drop mortgage 0.125***  Intermediate fin.lit. -0.059* 
  (0.038)    (0.031) 
Add consumer credit -0.009  Good fin.lit. -0.096*** 
  (0.037)    (0.030) 
Drop consumer credit -0.036  Risk-averse -0.011 
  (0.047)    (0.016) 
Add portfolio mgmt. -0.006  Moved  -0.060 
  (0.029)    (0.052) 
Drop portfolio mgmt. 0.040  Homeowner -0.021 
  (0.028)    (0.027) 
Add other -0.040  Employee  0.007 
  (0.030)   (0.024) 
Drop other 0.088*  Self-employed -0.010 
  (0.052)    (0.031) 
B: Bank controls   Income – Q2 0.008 
Cooperative  -0.099***   (0.039) 
  (0.026)  Income – Q3 0.008 
Savings  0.004    (0.038) 
  (0.034)  Income – Q4 0.006 
Size (in logs) 0.017**   (0.039) 
  (0.008)  Income – Q5 0.030 
ROA 0.067***    (0.043) 
  (0.022)  Net Wealth – Q2 0.021 
Equity/Total assets -0.002    (0.035) 
  (0.022)  Net Wealth – Q3 0.041 
Listed 0.005   (0.040) 
  (0.003)  Net Wealth – Q4 0.039 
M&A 0.002   (0.040) 
  (0.025)  Net Wealth – Q5 -0.028 
    (0.042) 
   Observations 5,081 
   Pseudo-R2 0.075 
Switch Drop used as dependent variable in alternative to Switch. All regression specifications include 
matrix X (dummies for time and area of residence, municipality size dummies), that are omitted due to 
space considerations.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: Robustness: alternative measures for household loyalty, main specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics 
Nr. Banks 0.063*** 0.063***   
 (0.017) (0.017)   
Long-lasting relationship    -0.111*** -0.110*** 
   (0.022) (0.022) 
Nr. Total services  -0.036***  -0.031***  
  (0.011)  (0.012)  
Payments   -0.065**  -0.041 
   (0.031)  (0.032) 
Insurance  -0.033  -0.050 
   (0.036)  (0.035) 
Mortgage  -0.003  -0.012 
   (0.024)  (0.025) 
Consumer credit  -0.092***  -0.077** 
   (0.034)  (0.038) 
Portfolio mgmt.   -0.050**  -0.034 
   (0.022)  (0.024) 
Other services  0.047  0.043 
  (0.043)  (0.050) 
Observations 5,081 5,081 4,166 4,166 
Pseudo-R2 0.066 0.069 0.080 0.082 
Exclusivity is substituted with Nr. Banks in Columns (1) to (2), and with Long-lasting relationship in Columns 
(3) to (4). All regression specifications include matrix B, H and X, here omitted due to space considerations. 
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Table 10: Robustness: alternative measures for household loyalty, change services 
specification.   
  (1) (2) 
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics 
Nr. Banks 0.061***  
 (0.018)  
Long-lasting relationship   -0.107*** 
  (0.022) 
Nr. Total services  -0.045*** -0.042** 
  (0.016) (0.017) 
Add payments 0.071* 0.074* 
  (0.040) (0.045) 
Drop payments -0.002 0.004 
  (0.027) (0.028) 
Add insurance -0.034 -0.050 
  (0.049) (0.050) 
Drop insurance 0.030 0.011 
  (0.050) (0.047) 
Add mortgage 0.148*** 0.174*** 
  (0.041) (0.046) 
Drop mortgage 0.129*** 0.144*** 
  (0.038) (0.042) 
Add consumer credit -0.014 -0.003 
  (0.038) (0.040) 
Drop consumer credit -0.044 -0.019 
  (0.047) (0.051) 
Add portfolio mgmt. -0.004 0.016 
  (0.030) (0.035) 
Drop portfolio mgmt. 0.036 0.058* 
  (0.029) (0.031) 
Add other services -0.036 -0.024 
  (0.031) (0.033) 
Drop other services 0.085 0.064 
 (0.052) (0.062) 
Observations 5,081 4,166 
Pseudo-R2 0.080 0.098 
Exclusivity is substituted with Nr. Banks in Column (1) and with Long-lasting 
relationship in Column (2). All regression specifications include matrix B, H and X, here 
omitted due to space considerations.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 












Dependent variable  
Switch  
Binary variable taking value 1 if between two consecutive SHIW waves 
a household changes its (main) bank, 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Switch New Binary variable taking value 1 if between two consecutive SHIW waves 
a household changes its main bank switching to a new one with which 
it did not have any previous relationship, 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Switch Drop Binary variable taking value 1 if between two consecutive SHIW waves 
a household changes its main bank without keeping it as a secondary 
bank, 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Regressors    
R: Household-bank relationship characteristics  
Exclusivity Binary variable taking value 1 if a household has only one bank, 0 
otherwise. 
SHIW 
Nr. Total services  Categorical variable counting the total number of bank services used 
by a household. 
SHIW 
Payments  Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses its main bank for 
the payment of utilities, rent and other expenses, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Insurance  Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses its main bank for 
insurance services, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Mortgage  Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses its main bank for 
mortgage, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Consumer Credit  Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses its main bank for 
consumer credit or personal loans, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Portfolio mgmt. Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses its main bank for 
securities custody, administration and management, and 0 otherwise.  
SHIW 
Other services  Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses its main bank for 
other services besides those described above, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Add [Specific service] Binary variable taking value 1 if a household does not use the specific 
service in wave t-1, but uses it in wave t, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Drop [Specific service] Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses a specific service in 
wave t-1, but does not use it in wave t, 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Nr. Banks Categorical variable counting the number of banks the household has 
relationship with (used as an alternative to the variable “exclusivity” 
defined above, as a measure of household’s loyalty to its main bank). 
SHIW 






Long-lasting  relationship Binary variable taking value 1 if a household has been using its main 
bank for more than 10 years, and 0 otherwise (used as an alternative to 
the variable “exclusivity “defined above, as a measure of household’s 
loyalty to its main bank). 
SHIW 
H: Household characteristics  
Household size Categorical variable counting the number of household members. SHIW 
Male Binary variable taking value 1 for a male household head, 0 for female. SHIW 
Age, Age2 
Integer variables representing the age of the household head and its 




Binary variable taking value 1 if the household head is married, and 0 
otherwise.  
SHIW 
Medium Education, High 
Education  
Binary variables taking value 1 for the corresponding level of 
education: Medium education corresponds to having completed 
secondary school and/or college; High education corresponds to having 
obtained a graduate and/or post-graduate degree. The reference 
category is Low education, i.e., having completed only primary 
education or having no education at all. 
SHIW 
Intermediate Financial 
Literacy, Good Financial 
Literacy 
Binary variables taking value 1 for the corresponding level of financial 
literacy: Intermediate financial literacy corresponds to having 
answered correctly only one question out of 2; Good financial literacy 
corresponds to having answered correctly to both questions. Reference 
category is Low Financial Literacy, meaning having given no correct 
answer. 
SHIW 
Risk-averse Binary variable taking value 1 if risk aversion level is 4, 0 otherwise.  
The risk-aversion level is obtained by means of a categorical variable 
representing the preferred risk profile of financial investments: 
1 = High risk, high returns 
2 = Reasonable risk, good returns 
3 = Low risk, reasonable returns 
4 = No risk, low returns 
SHIW 
Moved  Binary variable taking value 1 if a household changed its residence 
from one municipality to another between wave t-1 and wave t, and 0 
otherwise.  
SHIW 
Homeowner Binary variable taking value 1 if a household owns its primary 
residence, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Employee, Self-employed 
Binary variables taking value 1 for household heads being in the 
corresponding occupational status, 0 otherwise. Reference category is 
“non-working position”.  
SHIW 
 
Chapter 2: The Determinants of Household’s Bank Switching 
82 
 
Income (Net Wealth) 
quintiles  
Binary variables taking value 1 if the household’s yearly disposable 
income (net wealth, defined as the sum of real and financial assets net 
of liabilities) is within the relevant distribution quintiles, and 0 
otherwise. 
SHIW 
B: Bank characteristics  
Size  Bank's total assets, in logs.  BS 
Commercial, Cooperative, 
Savings  
Binary variables taking value 1 for the corresponding bank’s 
specialization. The reference category is Commercial bank. 
BS 
Listed  Binary variable taking value 1 if the bank is listed, and 0 otherwise. BS 
M&A Dummy variable taking value 1 if the bank underwent a process of 
Merge & Acquisition between t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise. BS 
Equity/Total assets 
Variable representing the ratio between bank’s equity and total assets, 
in percentage points. 
BS 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Variable representing the ratio between the bank’s pre-tax profits and 
assets, in percentage points. 
BS 
X: Background characteristics  
Time dummies 
(2010, 2012) 
Dummy variables taking value 1 in the relevant year, and 0 otherwise. 
The reference category is 2008. 
SHIW 
Regional dummies  
Dummy variables taking value 1 for the relevant macro-region (North-
West, Centre, South), and 0 otherwise. The reference category is 
North-East. 
SHIW 
Municipality size  
Categorical variable representing the size of the residential 
municipality: 
1 = less than 5,000 
2 = [5,000-20,000] 
3 = [20,000-50,000] 
4 = [50,000-200,000] 
5 = more than 200,000 
The model specifications include four dummies for municipality size 
from 2 to 5, i.e., the reference category is 1 (municipality size less 
than 5,000) 
SHIW 










3. Till Mortgage Do Us Part:                                






We study how a legislation change that exogenously reduced refinancing costs for mortgages 
had an impact on bank-switching behavior of the mortgage holders and on the competition in 
the mortgage market. Using household-level micro-data from Italy, we find that prior to the 
reform, when mortgages entailed particularly large refinancing costs, the mortgage clients were 
“locked in” with their bank, but the reform has effectively “broken the chains”. Dissecting the 
result, we find that this surge in their mobility was confined to more educated individuals and 
less competitive markets. We further show that the introduction of the new Law not only 
affected the behavior of extant mortgage holders, but also made taking out a mortgage a strong 
motivation to switch. This evidence suggests that the liberalization made the banks use the 
mortgages more competitively as a tool to attract new clients, but it also indicates that the 





Keywords: mortgage, refinancing fee, switching costs, natural experiment, 
             difference-in-differences 
JEL Classification: G21; D14  
                                                          
41 A special thanks to Giuseppe Ilardi at Bank of Italy who provided the regression estimates based on the restricted 
SHIW dataset. 




In economic theory, the conventional wisdom holds that switching costs are detrimental to 
competition (see, e.g., Klemperer, 1995). When a rational mortgage holder faces switching costs, 
as reflected in the cost of refinancing a loan, he will not switch to the bank offering him a “better 
deal” if these costs outweigh the terms differential between the two banks. The incumbent bank 
can exploit this situation to maintain unfavorable loan terms (i.e., to extract rents) without concern 
of losing the client. This “lock in” effect should, however, weaken as the refinancing costs 
decrease. In a nutshell, if the theory holds, the fall of such costs to a sufficiently low level should 
spark bank switching among the mortgage clients (in the presence of better alternatives).  
Despite this straightforward theoretical prediction, to the best of our knowledge this 
hypothesis has not been empirically tested yet. Most of the literature on switching costs is quite 
general and theoretical in nature (see Klemperer, 1995, and Farrell and Klemperer, 2005, for 
excellent reviews of the literature). The main challenge to the empirical investigation of switching 
costs is related to the fact that they are typically not directly observable (Shy, 2002). Instead, the 
economists must infer their magnitude from clients’ observed switching behavior (Dubé et al., 
2008). Such analysis requires detailed micro-level data, which are very rarely available (Kim et 
al., 2003). 
To overcome these challenges, this paper relies on a unique dataset and an empirical strategy 
exploiting an exogenous shock to refinancing costs in the mortgage market. More specifically, we 
study a legal change in Italy in early 2007 that exogenously reduced refinancing costs for 
mortgages – a bank service that entailed particularly large switching costs a priori – with the aim 
of increasing flexibility in the mortgage market. The reform, commonly referred to as the “Bersani 
Law”, enabled the bank borrowers to prepay the loan at their current bank or change their loan 
provider without requiring authorization from the initial lender and without any (or at significantly 
reduced) charges. The main cost reduction was introduced by cutting early termination penalties 
imposed by the banks (prepayment fee) and mortgage registration and notary fees. We explore this 
natural experiment using a difference-in-differences methodology that compares switching 
propensities of a treated group of bank retail clients with a control group. “Treated” clients have a 
mortgage that is still outstanding around the change in the law. We compare the treated clients’ 
switching propensities with those of the control group, composed of bank clients without a 
mortgage, controlling for a rich set of clients’ and banks’ observable characteristics. Importantly 
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for our purpose, we are able to identify a causal relationship between the reduction of refinancing 
costs and the hike in switching among the mortgage clients, since the legal change is exogenous 
to both client and bank idiosyncratic developments. The second key strength of our empirical 
strategy stems from a rich, representative household survey dataset, provided by the Bank of Italy, 
complemented with Bankscope information on banks, which allows us to control for a wide set of 
household and bank characteristics, as well as features of their relationship. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we document that, prior to the 
introduction of the Bersani Law, the mortgage clients had a significantly (23%) lower share of 
switchers than comparable clients without a mortgage, but the change in the law sparked mortgage 
holders’ propensity to switch to the rate 25% higher than among the clients in the control group. 
This result suggests that the mortgages produced a “lock in” for the clients, but the reform has 
effectively “broken the chains”. Dissecting this result, we show that a client’s responsiveness to 
the reform is defined by the client’s sophistication (as proxied by his educational attainment) and 
market competition in the area of client’s residence (as proxied by the Herfindahl index). First, we 
find that the effect of the legislation is confined to more educated individuals. The results have the 
important policy implication that the sophistication of bank clients is instrumental to the 
effectiveness of policy that aims at enhancing clients’ mobility through a reduction in refinancing 
costs. Next, we document that the Bersani Law prompted switching of the mortgage holders only 
in the less competitive environments, which indicates that in such markets the households initially 
held less affordable mortgages. We further show that the reform not only altered the switching 
behavior of the extant mortgage holders, but also made taking out a mortgage a strong motivation 
to switch. This evidence of “mortgage shopping” supports the notion of Bennett et al. (2001) that 
regulation in the US mortgage market made mortgage origination more competitive and increased 
the financial awareness of homeowners. Taken together, our results suggest that mortgage 
refinancing costs play an important role in retail banking markets, affecting behavior of both banks 
and their clients. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the related literature; Section 
3 describes the Italian mortgage market and the new Law passed in 2007; Section 4 introduces our 
data and variables; Section 5 outlines our methodological approach; Section 6 presents our results 
and the associated robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
Overall, as Zinman (2014) puts it, “…household debt is a neglected topic within the 
relatively neglected sub-field of household finance”. In particular, since the mortgage loans 
constitute the predominant type of financial liabilities of households (Guiso and Sodini, 2012; 
Brown and Hoffmann, 2013; ECB, 2013) and the bulk of bank loans in developed economies 
(Beck et al., 2012), there is surprisingly little empirical work on the dynamics of mortgage 
relationships. 42  To the best of our knowledge, there is little (if any) empirical evidence on 
switching by bank retail borrowers. 
The bulk of the literature on retail client switching investigates switching by the depositors 
(i.e., the banks’ creditors), focusing on (perceived) bank distress as a driver of deposit withdrawals 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 2013 and Iyer et al., 2013). In a recent contribution, using Swiss survey 
data, Brown et al. (2013) investigate to which extent switching costs mitigate a run-off from a 
distressed bank. The bank borrowers are expected to be less concerned about the bank’s soundness, 
whereas their main motivation for switching banks are the offered loan terms. 
Literature in corporate lending investigates, e.g., the motivation of a firm for switching a 
bank (Gopalan, 2011), the impact of bank mergers on the small firms’ decision to stay, switch, or 
drop a bank (Degryse et al., 2011), and loan conditions when firms switch banks (Ioannidou and 
Ongena, 2010). Using Bolivian credit registry data, Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) document the 
bank practice of luring the corporate clients with competitive loan terms compared to those offered 
by their current bank – only to spike up the interest rate soon after the switch. However, for a 
switch to occur in that concept, the offered interest rate discount has to outweigh the switching 
costs a client faces. We contribute to this literature by directly investigating the role played by 
switching costs in the credit markets. 
Our work is also closely related to the literature on industrial organization, which studies 
switching costs in the context of entry deterrence, market power, and rent extraction (see, e.g.,  
Klemperer, 1995, for an excellent summary of the pioneering theoretical work, and Barone et al., 
2011, for a more recent literature review). Although the nature of switching costs largely varies 
                                                          
42 Brown and Hoffmann (2013), for example, compare mortgage and non-mortgage relations of Swiss households 
using survey data, and document systematic differences between the two types of relationships. 
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across different industries, one common denominator is that switching costs in general are very 
difficult to measure. Kim et al. (2013), for example, infer their significance in Norwegian credit 
markets by analysing aggregated data on interest rates and market shares. By exploiting an 
exogenous source of variation in switching costs and unique micro-level data, we are able to 
investigate empirically the role that switching costs play in the mortgage market. 
We also contribute to the literature on household sophistication. A large body of work 
documents that poorer education (Campbell, 2006; Calvet et al., 2007 and 2009), financial literacy 
(see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014), and cognitive abilities (e.g., Christelis et al., 2010, and Grinblatt 
et al., 2011) are all positively correlated with sub-optimal financial behavior. These financial 
decisions range from inefficient saving (Jappelli and Padula, 2013), a lack of retirement planning 
(van Rooij et al., 2012), more costly financial instruments (Hastings and Mitchell, 2011, and 
Lusardi and Tufano, 2009), and a lack of portfolio diversification (Guiso and Jappelli, 2009) to 
reluctance to hold stocks (van de Rooij et al., 2011), inertia in stock market participation and 
trading (Bilias et al., 2010), and sluggish mortgage refinancing (Campbell, 2006).43 Cole et al. 
(forthcoming) document that education not only increases the equity holdings, but also reduces the 
probability of financial hardship (declaring bankruptcy, facing a foreclosure or becoming 
delinquent on a loan). We build on this body of work by investigating the heterogeneity of 
responsiveness to a policy that made switching more affordable for mortgage holders across 
households of different levels of education. 
3.3 Institutional Background 
The collapse in the subprime mortgage market in the US triggered a financial crisis in 2007 
that subsequently spilled over to other countries. In Italy, however, this contagion was limited. The 
Italian banks were characterized by a traditional banking model that relied on stable bank financing 
and a rigorous assessment of the borrowers’ ability to pay. Prudence was the most salient in retail 
lending (De Bonis et al., 2012). As a result of such practices, and of strict housing credit 
regulations, typical loan-to-value ratios on mortgages in 2007 were among the lowest in Europe, 
                                                          
43 Campbell (2006) reports that one of the most widespread financial mistakes of US households is failure to refinance 
a mortgage when it becomes profitable. 
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as was the share of the troubled loans (IMF, 2013). Furthermore, Italian mortgage markets were 
smaller (relative to the GDP) than those in other EU countries (Hess and Holzhausen, 2008). 
The Law 40/2007, commonly referred to as the “Bersani Law” after Pier Luigi Bersani, the 
minister who proposed it, introduced a set of liberalization measures in several sectors in Italy, 
aimed to promote consumer protection, enhance competition, and increase the overall economic 
activity.44 The most relevant measure concerning the market for mortgage loans was a substantial 
reduction of the mortgage refinancing costs, mainly through a cut of the mortgage registration and 
notary fees and especially the early repayment fees imposed by the banks. Prior to the Bersani 
Law, the magnitude of these costs strongly discouraged mortgage holders to switch to another 
bank. Banks used to charge a penalty of at least 1% of the value of the loan for early mortgage 
termination. Furthermore, since the old mortgage had to be cancelled and replaced by a new 
contract, the procedure involved additional costs, such as registration taxes and notary fees. As a 
result, the overall cost of changing a mortgage provider was at least 3% of the mortgage amount.  
One of the main provisions introduced by the reform was the facilitation of the mortgage 
subrogation (i.e., “portability”), where a mortgage is transferred to another bank by the will of the 
debtor, with the declared intent of increasing the mobility of the mortgage holders.45 To exercise 
the mortgage subrogation, several conditions have to be met, the most important one being that 
the amount of the loan cannot be changed. On the other hand, the reform now allowed the level 
and type of the interest rate (e.g., fixed vs. floating) as well as the maturity of the loan to be altered, 
with fully transferable collateral and without losing the tax benefits that the initial mortgage might 
have entailed, without (or at significantly reduced) costs.46 The current bank was not entitled to 
                                                          
44 Law 40/2007 was passed on 2 April 2007, converting the corresponding decree that had been issued on January 31st  
of the same year. In what follows, “Bersani Law” and “Bersani Decree” are used interchangeably. 
45 The mechanism of subrogation was already provided by the Italian Law (see art. 1202 of the Civil Code). In practice, 
however, this article was inapplicable to the banking relationships, due to certain clauses banks commonly included in 
the contracts prior to the introduction of the Bersani Law. 
46 Specifically, the new Law introduced the following set of thresholds for the prepayment penalties: 
a) All payment penalties were abolished for the mortgage loans granted from 3 April 2007 or first home 
mortgages granted after 2 February 2007. 
b) For mortgages originated after 2001, a fee of up to 1.9% of principal outstanding can be imposed. 
c) The maximum applicable penalty equal to 0.5% of the principal outstanding is set for the mortgages originated 
prior to 2001. 
d) A further reduction of the penalties was mandated for loans maturing in 3 (2) years, for which the fees are cut 
to 0.2% (no fee), respectively. 
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oppose the households’ choice. The new legislation was closely followed by the media and, not 
surprisingly, warmly welcomed by the households, while fiercely opposed by the banks.  
In sum, the Bersani Law made mortgage prepayment and/or refinancing substantially simpler 
and cheaper, allowing the households to exercise full mortgage refinancing at reduced cost, and 
eventually at no cost at all. The Italian mortgage market thus became similar to the US and Danish 
markets, where the prepayment penalties are set to zero. The extent to which the Bersani Law was 
effective in promoting competition in the mortgage market via an increase in mobility of mortgage 
holders, which is the question we address in this study, remains not empirically verified to date. 
3.4 Data and Variables 
3.4.1 Dataset 
Our main data source is the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a biannual 
household survey set up by the Bank of Italy. The interviewees, half of whom are rotating panel 
units, form a population-representative sample in a given year. The basic statistical unit of the 
survey is a household, which includes all people who normally reside in the dwelling and have 
contributed at least part of their income. Each household reports a household head, defined as the 
person primarily responsible for the household budget, who answers the bulk of the questions on 
behalf of his/her household members.47 The sample used in the recent surveys consists of about 
8,000 households (24,000 individuals), distributed across about 300 Italian municipalities. The 
scope of the survey has grown over the years, with a questionnaire comprising about 200 questions. 
In addition to the demographic and socio-economic details, the survey now provides a wealth of 
information on different aspects of economic and financial behavior, including the choice of the 
financial intermediaries and financial services used. What is important for our purpose is that the 
panel component of the survey, combined with the household’s bank identifier, enables us to infer 
whether a household changed its (main) bank between two survey waves. Using the same 
identifier, we are able to supplement the dataset with the bank-level information from Bankscope 
(BS) – a source collecting extensive bank data from their balance sheets and income statements, 
as well as more general information, such as the bank history and the specialization. 
                                                          
47 See Bank of Italy (2012) for more information on the sampling and interviewing methods employed in the SHIW. 
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3.4.2 Variable definitions 
This section describes the variables used in our empirical analysis. The variables central to the 
analysis are constructed from a SHIW module that collects information on household-bank 
relationshis. The households are asked to report the bank(s) they use, to single out the one they use 
most often (their main bank), and to list the services used with the bank. Households may indicate 
one or more services among the following: payments of utilities, rent, or other expenses; mortgage; 
consumer credit and personal loans; securities custody, administration, and management; and 
insurance. 
Exploiting the panel component of the SHIW, we follow the households over time and 
construct our dependent variable Switch. It is a binary variable being 1 in t if household i changed 
its main bank between wave t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise.48 We also build a control variable for 
exclusivity of a bank relationship The only bank used as a dummy being 1 if a household has 
dealings with one bank only, and 0 otherwise. 
In line with the literature on household finance, we control for a wide set of standard socio-
economic and demographic characteristics that may affect the households’ economic decisions. 
The economic condition of a household is captured by Income and Net wealth, both in the form of 
quintiles. We also control for the household size by means of a count variable, for the household 
head’s age in both linear and quadratic terms, and for gender and marital status by means of two 
dummies for Male and Married, respectively. Education is controlled for with two dummies for 
the highest educational attainment of the household head, these being secondary school or college 
(Medium education) and graduate or post-graduate level (High education). The SHIW also 
provides a self-reported measure of risk aversion, as the household head is asked to indicate the 
preferred investment profile among four types, ranging from 1 (high risk, high returns) to 4 (no 
risk, low returns). We use a dummy taking the value of 1 if the preferred investment profile is the 
fourth (Risk-averse). We also control for the homeownership by means of a dummy for owning 
the residential house (Homeowner) and for household head’s main professional occupation, 
                                                          
48 To account for a possible bank consolidation between two SHIW interviews, we adopt a conservative definition of 
switching where we do not count as a switch if a household turns to a bank that has been involved in a merger or an 
acquisition with the household’s previous bank. We do not count “forced” switches either, where a household had to 
switch simply because his previous bank ceased to exist. 
Chapter 3: Till Mortgage Do Us Part: Refinancing Costs and Competition in the Mortgage Market 
91 
 
including dummies for being Employee or Self-employed, thus having the “non-working” as the 
reference category. We also control for the bank features such as its specialization, performance, 
size, and recent involvement in a merger or an acquisition. Bank specialization is captured by 
means of two dummies for the Cooperative or Savings bank, with the commercial banks being the 
reference category. We proxy the bank profitability by Return on Assets (ROA), whereas we proxy 
the bank size by the bank total assets (Bank Size). We also include a dummy for recent M&A 
involvement (M&A), this being 1 if the bank was involved in M&A process between t-1 and t, and 
0 otherwise. 
For a detailed definition of all the variables used in the analysis, see Table A1. 
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 lists the variables used in this study. We report the descriptive statistics at the 
household level for the observations that we used to estimate our main empirical model, as in 
equation (1). These observations are drawn from the SHIW biannual survey from 2004 to 2008.49 
Panel A presents the statistics for controls used in our difference-in-differences estimation, thus 
including the observations from 2004 and 2006.50 Panel B provides statistics for our dependent 
variable and the main variables of interest. Over the three waves, there are 2,021 unique 
households in our estimation sample. The sample is an unbalanced panel for a total of 2,898 
observations.51  
The average age of the household heads is around 54 years, about 70% are males, 72% are 
married, and 68% have a college degree, while 14% obtained an advanced academic degree. The 
median household is composed of 3 people. Median household income is around €38,000, the 
median net wealth is €242,000, and 75% of households own their house. About 42% of the 
household heads work as employees, 18% are self-employed, and the rest are not working. The 
majority of the households use only one bank and no more than one bank service in addition to a 
                                                          
49 We drop the households in which the household head is aged over 91 or below 19, as well as the households that 
report negative total consumption or possess neither financial nor real assets. 
50 More on the choice of timing of the regressors follows.  
51 For consistency, in Panel A, we present the statistics for 2,291 observations used in the econometric estimation of 
equation (1) with a full set of controls. The statistics for the initial 2,898 observations are largely similar.  
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bank account. Overall, 87% of households use a commercial bank (as their main bank), 7% use a 
cooperative bank, and 6% use a savings bank. There are 83 banks used by the households in our 
estimation sample, which hold 94% of total assets of all commercial, cooperative, and savings 
banks in the Italian market. 
3.5 Methodology 
In our main econometric analysis, we examine the effect of a legal change using a difference-
in-differences (DiD) approach. This methodology relies on measuring the differential effect of the 
event on a group that is affected by the legal change, which we refer to as “the treated group”, and 
a group that is not directly affected by it, which is “the control group”. Our “treatment” is the 
Bersani Law that focused on mortgages, thus our treated group is the households that have a 
mortgage that is still outstanding around the time of the change in the law, and the control group 
is the households that do not hold a mortgage. 
Figure 1 illustrates the timeline that we use in our methodological approach. The notches on 
the axes represent the timing of our biannual observations and the reform we analyze in this study. 
The Bersani Law came into effect in early 2007, between two SHIW waves; thus, we can compare 
household’s bank switching propensity before and after the legal change. In our empirical 
framework, we face at least two conceptual limitations. The first is related to the nature of our 
dependent variable, Switch. As we infer switching from bank(s) a household declared to use in 
survey waves t-1 and t, we are unable to observe the exact timing of a switch, but we can only 
identify whether switching took place at some point between the two interviews. To address this 
peculiarity of the data, we use lagged regressors. The second limitation concerns the time span to 
be used in our DiD estimation. In each period, a household may choose to take out a mortgage 
and/or switch bank, which confounds our identification strategy in a setting with more than two 
periods. For this reason, we initially restrict our analysis to a two-period DiD estimation.52 We 
relax this restriction in the robustness analysis, where we estimate a fixed-effects model. 
                                                          
52 For clarification, looking at Figure 1, it is clear that if we included observations from 2010 to our analysis, we would 
include mortgages that may have been taken out after 2007, i.e., after the Bersani Law was introduced. This setting 
would be inappropriate for a DiD estimation of the impact of the reform, as refinancing costs for these new mortgages 
are set to zero since their very origination. A two-period DiD also enables us to avoid the main concerns raised by 
Bertrand et al. (2004) on the serial correlation of the standard errors, which often plagues the DiD analysis. The 
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The crucial element in any DiD specification is a viability of a “common trend assumption”. 
This assumption implies that the treated and the control group would have evolved similarly if 
there had not been a legal change, i.e., the non-mortgage holders are a valid control group to assess 
the counterfactual of what would be the trend for the mortgage holders if the Bersani Law had not 
been introduced. The evolution in behavior of the treated and the control group prior to the event, 
as depicted in Figure 2, provides a reasonably reliable indicator. Figure 2 plots the shares of 
switchers among the mortgage holders (households that always report having a mortgage) vs. the 
non-mortgage holders (households that never report having a mortgage) from 2004-2010. The 
nods correspond to the statistics computed biannually, connected by the lines for ease of the visual 
representation. In support of our identification strategy, prior to the reform in 2007 the share of 
switchers among the mortgage holders and non-mortgage holders has been evolving close to 
parallel, i.e., sharing a “common trend”. This figure also provides support to the notion that the 
Bersani Law had a strong impact on the switching behavior of the mortgage holders. Namely, prior 
to the reform, they were significantly less likely to switch their bank compared to other bank 
clients, whereas they became the prime switchers following 2007, and this “inversion” effect is 
large. 
To evaluate this effect more rigorously, we estimate the following regression equation: 
yit =α0 +α1𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝it−1  +α2𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t +α3(𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝it−1 × 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t) +  𝐗it−1θ+εit     (1), 
where yit  is our dependent variable Switch. The main explanatory variable of interest is the 
interaction term 𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝it−1 × 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t where 𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝it−1 is a binary variable taking value 1 if 
household 𝑖 has a mortgage in t-1 and 0 otherwise and 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t is a binary variable taking the value 
of 1 if the year falls after the introduction of the Bersani Law, and 0 otherwise, 𝐗it−1 is a vector of 
control variables, and εit is the error term. The model is estimated on a restricted sample of 2004-
2008, to compare the switching right before and after the legal change (i.e., switching between 
2004 and 2006 compared to switching between 2006 and 2008). If the Bersani Law had the 
predicted effect, α3 (our DiD estimator) is expected to be statistically significant and positive. 
                                                          
alternative method the authors propose is to compare pre- and post-reform averages (as, e.g., in Cerqueiro et al., 2014), 
but since our dependent variable is a dummy measuring a change of the bank used, this in inapplicable in our study. 
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Specifically, α3 measures the differential effect of the change in the law across households that 
held a mortgage around the time the Bersani Law was introduced and those who did not.53 
So far, our framework focused on the mortgage loans outstanding around the change in the 
law, i.e., the extant mortgages. Our second empirical model aims to assess the effect of the reform 
on new mortgage issues, i.e., the mortgages taken out between two waves of interviews. The 
economic rationale is the following. The reform is likely to have affected the incentives of both 
banks and their retail clients. Banks, now operating in the mortgage market with substantially lower 
switching costs, have to compete more aggressively to attract new mortgage buyers. On the other 
hand, the households taking out a mortgage are less reluctant to do so at another bank (increasing 
the household’s mobility), since they are aware that newly ensured flexibility in the market will 
enable them to switch again should they wish. In other words, the households can now afford to 
make a mistake in choosing a bank, since they can change their mind anytime in the future at no 
penalty. As a result, we expect the households taking out a mortgage to have become less inert, 
i.e., more likely to switch banks for that purpose, than those taking out a mortgage prior to the 
reform. We test this empirically by estimating the following regression equation, splitting the 
sample around the date of entry into force of the Bersani Law, i.e., in the subsamples prior to and 
after 2007: 
yit =β0 +β1𝑨𝒅𝒅 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑖t +  𝐗it−1θ+εit                 (2), 
where yit is our dependent variable Switch. 𝑨𝒅𝒅 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑖t indicates the households that did 
not hold a mortgage with their bank in t-1 and they take it out in t, 𝐗 is a vector of control variables 
(lagged one period) andεit is the error term. If the sharp reduction in switching costs induced by 
the reform had the predicted effect, we expect β1 to be positive and statistically significant in the 
period following the legislative change, whereas the association should be weaker (if at all) prior 
to the reform. 
                                                          
53 Limited data on loan terms, however, does not allow us to observe the mortgage renegotiations with the original 
lender. To the extent that the bank acts to keep the customer, and some mortgages may get refinanced at the current 
bank, our analysis actually captures a lower bound of the refinancing volume. 




3.6.1 Extant Mortgage Loans  
The univariate analysis of our sample provides preliminary evidence of the effect the “Bersani 
Law” had on the switching behavior of the bank retail clients. Table 2 displays the share of 
switchers for the treated group (mortgage holders) and the control group (other bank retail clients), 
as well as differences of means test. Prior to the reform, significantly fewer households in the 
treated group had switched, compared to the share of switchers in the control group, corroborating 
anecdotal evidence of high switching costs for the mortgage holders. The magnitude of this wedge 
is economically important and statistically significant at 10% confidence level. In turn, following 
the change in the law, the treated group experienced a much sharper increase in the share of 
switchers compared to the control group, resulting in a reversed wedge, i.e., a larger share of 
switchers among the mortgage holders than among the clients without a mortgage. Again, the 
difference between the two groups is statistically significant and economically important. In a 
nutshell, the univariate analysis shows that prior to the reform there had been 7.5% fewer switchers 
among the mortgage holders than among the bank clients without a mortgage, whereas after the 
reform the mortgage holders switched about 6% more than clients in the control group. When 
interpreting Table 2, however, one should bear in mind that the statistics do not account for the 
potential heterogeneity across the households, banks, and time. 
To allow for these factors, we carry out a multivariate analysis using a difference-in-differences 
estimation, as explained in Section 5. The estimates in Table 3 correspond to the coefficients 
obtained by an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (1), varying the controls 
included in the estimation.54 All coefficients are estimated using the sample weights, with the 
robust standard errors clustered at the province level.55 In the first column, we present a model 
where we estimate the “baseline” DiD, i.e., a difference-in-differences model without the control 
variables. The results are in line with the statistics in Table 2 and the visual representation in Figure 
                                                          
54 OLS is employed for ease of interpretation of the reported results. Furthermore, the interaction terms in non-linear 
models may be biased and imprecisely estimated (see Ai and Norton, 2003). We re-estimated our regressions using a 
probit model, obtaining largely comparable results. 
55 Our main results are robust to clustering of the standard errors at fewer clusters with regard to the provinces (i.e., 
clustering at the level of regions and macro-regions), as well as to clustering at the bank level. 
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2. Most importantly, our DiD coefficient estimate (Treated x Post) is large in magnitude and 
strongly significant statistically. A simple interpretation of the results in column (1) is that the 
increase from 2006 to 2008 in the proportion of switchers among the mortgage holders is 15% 
higher than the increase in the share of switchers in the control group for the same period. This 
result, however, may be driven by the differences (in the cross-section and over time) in the socio-
economic features of the clients in the treated group compared to the clients in the control group, 
of the banks they are using and/or the regions they reside in, for example. To obtain a DiD estimate 
net of such potentially confounding factors, in columns (2)-(4) we add various controls to the base 
model. As we increase the number of controls, our DiD coefficient increases in magnitude 
remaining statistically significant at 1% level. Column (2) presents the results for the model that 
controls only for the region fixed effects and for the population size in the municipality of the 
household residence. All coefficient estimates are almost identical to those in column (1). In 
column (3), we add household controls to the model which the household finance literature relates 
to their financial choices: education level (dummies for medium-level and higher education), 
household size, age (linear and squared), gender (male dummy), marital status (married dummy), 
risk aversion (dummy for being risk-averse), homeownership (dummy for owning the property), 
employment status (dummies for employee and self-employed) and income and wealth (both in the 
form of quintiles). We also control for exclusivity of the relationship with the bank (the dummy 
being 1 if the bank is the only one a households uses). The estimated wedge between the treated 
and the control groups becomes larger in magnitude both before (Treated) and after the reform 
(Treated*Post), and more precisely estimated compared to column (2). In column (4), we also add 
the controls for the bank characteristics, such as its specialization (dummies for being a cooperative 
or savings bank, with the commercial banks being the reference category), profitability (as captured 
by return on assets), size (as proxied by bank size), and recent organizational restructuring (the 
dummy being 1 if a household’s initial bank was recently involved in an M&A process). In this 
“full” model, we document further increase in magnitude for both treatment dummy (wedge 
between the two groups right before the reform) and DiD estimate (the same wedge following the 
reform). Controlling for a rich set of household characteristics, bank features, and exclusivity of 
their relationship, as well as for the region fixed effects and municipality size, we can infer that a 
mortgage holder was around 23% less likely to switch his/her bank than a comparable household 
in the control group preceding the reform, whereas after the introduction of the Bersani Law the 
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likelihood of switching was about 25% higher for the mortgage holders than for the households 
without a mortgage. One should also note that the dummy Post becomes insignificant after the 
household controls are included in column (3), which suggests that once we account for the change 
in the household characteristics between 2006 and 2008 (such as employment status and economic 
condition, for example), we find no increase in the switching propensity among the clients in our 
control group (i.e., the households without a mortgage). Based on the results presented in Table 3, 
we can argue a causal effect of the Bersani Law to the hike in share of mortgage holders who switch 
bank, and thus the effectiveness in meeting the legislator’s goal to increase their mobility.56 
The Role of Household Sophistication: 
To dissect this finding, we first split the sample according to the household sophistication. We 
argue that for the mortgage holders to respond (in a timely manner) to the changed market 
circumstances two conditions must be met. First, they must learn and understand the content of the 
new Law and the implications for the dynamics of their relationship with a bank. Second, they must 
be able to compare the competing offers across banks and choose the most suitable one. Both tasks 
are very likely to depend on the household sophistication, which we proxy for by the household 
head’s level of education. We re-estimate the equation (1) for the subsamples of households whose 
head obtained at least a secondary school diploma (medium education level in Italy) and those with 
a lower level of education. The results for the two subsamples are presented in Table 4, panels A 
and B, respectively. It is apparent that the findings in Table 3 are confined to the pool of better-
educated individuals and, thus, that the household sophistication drives the results therein. This 
finding is particularly worrying for the policy makers, as the majority of households that take out 
a mortgage lack knowledge of basic financial concepts (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). These 
households also seem more likely to have inappropriate mortgage terms in the first place, and 
subsequently to be in need of having their loan arrangement altered.57 It has also been documented 
                                                          
56 In Table 3, we do not condition on still having a mortgage in t, which would constrain our analysis to the mortgage 
refinancing alone. As the reform cut the prepayment fees in addition to the costs of changing the mortgage lender, 
conditioning only on having a mortgage in t-1 allows us also to include the mortgage prepayments. As a narrower 
specification, we replicate Table 3 conditioning on having a mortgage in both t-1 and t. The results remain largely 
unaltered and are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
57 For example, Moore (2003) reports that, in the US, the victims to predatory lending are less likely to understand 
basic financial concepts, suggesting that they were not aware of the cost of their mortgage loans. Furthermore, Mayer 
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that less educated individuals have more difficulties recalling the terms of their mortgage (Bucks 
and Pence, 2008) and self-report implausibly low mortgage rates (Campbell, 2006). Using the US 
data from the recent financial meltdown, Gerardi et al. (2010) find that a low numerical ability of 
the households was a contributing factor to the massive mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. 
Devlin (2002) reports that less financially savvy households choose their banks primarily based on 
convenience and referral, whereas for the financially sophisticated ones the product quality and 
price are more important factors. Along the same lines, Brown and Hoffmann (2013) document 
that the financially sophisticated borrowers are less likely to establish a mortgage relationship 
based on geographical proximity. However, we are unable to disentangle whether the documented 
role of sophistication in our findings is to be ascribed to lower importance of the intrinsic product 
features (price, fees), reduced attention (i.e., insufficient information acquired), lack of information 
processing skills (i.e., limited understanding of the information), or inertia (i.e., delayed 
responsiveness to information acquired) among the less educated mortgage holders. Yet, our 
findings certainly support the rich body of literature that relates various measures of household 
sophistication (education, financial literacy, and cognitive abilities) to the sub-optimal financial 
behavior (see, e.g., Campbell, 2006; Calvet et al., 2007 and 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014; 
Christelis et al., 2010; and Andersen et al., 2014).58 
The Role of Competition: 
Next, we investigate the role of competition in the households’ responsiveness to the  
Bersani Law. The effect of competition is not unambiguous a priori. On the one hand, low 
competition implies fewer (attractive) outside opportunities, which should make the households 
less responsive to the facilitated portability of a mortgage (“availability of substitutes” argument). 
On the other hand, the households in less competitive environments may have unfavorable 
mortgage conditions in the first place, and may therefore be more likely to seek to refinance them 
(“initial condition” argument). Therefore, ex ante, it is difficult to sign the effect of competition in 
                                                          
et al. (2013) report that, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, banks in the US also used prepayment fees in a predatory 
manner. 
58 Less sophisticated clients may not be responsive to the Bersani Law simply because they cannot obtain a mortgage 
on favorable terms due to their lower credit quality. Although we cannot fully rule this out, a very low percentage of 
the households in our sample who reported having been rejected for a mortgage application or having been discouraged 
from applying for a loan because they thought they would be turned down provides a reasonable indicator that this 
alternative explanation is not confounding our analysis. 
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our context. We answer this question empirically by splitting the sample according to the bank 
competition in the market, as proxied by the Herfindahl index computed from the number of ATMs 
of banks operating in the province of the household residence. Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 
report the results for the low and high level of bank competition, respectively. Our main findings 
are confirmed only for the households living in the provinces with less fierce bank competition, 
providing evidence in support of the “initial condition” argument, i.e., that these households held 
less affordable mortgages in the first place. 
An alternative explanation would be that, ceteris paribus, high competition equipped the 
households with significant bargaining power to renegotiate a mortgage with their initial bank. 
According to this argument, in such environments the Bersani Law had little or no effect on 
refinancing with an outside bank (i.e., switching to transfer a mortgage) – as is supported by Panel 
B.59 
Robustness Checks: 
First, in order to test the robustness of our identification strategy, we perform a simple placebo 
test. Specifically, we analyze whether the reform had an effect on the households holding a 
consumer loan, as market conditions for this type of liabilities should not have been directly 
affected by the Bersani Law. That is, we re-estimate the model as in Table 3, specifying as treated 
the households holding a consumer and/or personal loan, instead of those with a mortgage.60 The 
results are reported in Table 6. In support to our identification strategy, the DiD estimate is low in 
magnitude and not statistically significant. 
Second, to address the heterogeneity concerns in the specification in equation (1), we estimate 
a fixed effects model of the form: 
yit =αi +Υt +β(𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝i × 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t) + 𝐗it−1θ+εit     (3),  
                                                          
59 Since we cannot observe the mortgage renegotiations with the original bank, we cannot investigate this issue further. 
We can only gauge the mortgage refinancing if it coincides with the bank switching, meaning a household refinances 
a mortgage with a bank that is different from its original lender. 
60 So as not to confound the treated and control groups, we drop from the sample all households that also hold a 
mortgage in addition to a personal loan. In doing so, we lose very few of the treated observations, since few households 
in our sample hold both a consumer loan and a mortgage with the bank. 
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where yit  is our dependent variable Switch. The main explanatory variable of interest is the 
interaction term 𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝i × 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t where 𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝i is a binary variable taking value 1 if 
household 𝑖 has a mortgage in t-1 and t and 0 if it reports not having a mortgage in either of the 
two periods and 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t  is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the year falls after the 
introduction of the Bersani Law, and 0 otherwise; 𝐗it−1 is a vector of control variables, and εit is 
the error term. The specification includes the household fixed effects (αi) and the year fixed effects 
(Υt) to narrow down the analysis to within variation (where each household de facto becomes its 
own control group).61 As in equation (1), our DiD estimator (β) is expected to be statistically 
significant and positive. The model is estimated on a sample of 2004-2012. We drop the households 
that took out a mortgage after the reform, as these mortgages are “younger” than the treatment. We 
only keep the households that are in a panel at least twice starting from 2004, i.e., we can potentially 
observe their switching decision at least once before the reform and once after the reform.62 
Table 7 reports the regression estimates of equation (3) for the full sample (Panel A), and 
then the sample is split, based on a competition proxy in the area of the household residence (Panel 
B and Panel C). Despite a significant drop in the number of units with regard to a model without 
fixed effects, Panel A shows that our main result, reported in Table 3, is robust to controlling for 
household heterogeneity (to the extent that these differences are fixed over time). Panels B and C 
further confirm that the Bersani effect is present only in less competitive environments. 
  
                                                          
61 Treated identifies the households that always report having a mortgage, whereas the control group consists of the 
households that never report having a mortgage. We therefore drop the households that changed their mortgage status 
(i.e., that took a mortgage out in t or paid it off between t-1 and t) in order to get a “clean” DiD estimate of within-
household variability conditional on the mortgage status. We do not include Treated and Post separately in the model, 
because the former is spanned by the household fixed effects, whereas the latter is spanned by the year fixed effects. 
62 To be included in our sample, a household has to be surveyed in the SHIW at least in 2004, 2006 and 2008, so that 
we can potentially observe its switching decision prior to the Bersani Law (between 2004 and 2006) and following the 
reform (between 2006 and 2008). This construction results in an unbalanced panel, as some households are surveyed 
also in 2010 and 2012. 
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An Alternative Driver of Switching – Change in Interest Rates: 
A significant drop in the interest rates represents a possible driver of switching for the 
households that are bank debtors. If the interest rate charged on the mortgage loans is reduced, 
refinancing a mortgage becomes more attractive, which may in itself be a sufficiently strong 
motivaton for switching, even if the refinancing costs remain (or are perceived to be) unaltered. 
However, this is rather unlikely to be driving our results in Tables 3-5, since in the 2006-2008 
period on which we estimate our main DiD model the mortgage rates increased, rather than 
decreased, as a result of the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the European Central Bank (see 
Figure 3). 63 If anything, the evolution of the interest rates would work against our finding of a 
significant effect of the Bersani Law. 
3.6.2 New Mortgages 
We turn to investigating the effect of the Bersani Law on the newly originated mortgages. In 
particular, we analyze whether the reform advanced the role that taking out a mortgage plays in a 
household’s decision to switch its bank. Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation (2) on 
two subsamples – prior to the reform and following the reform. Since we want to compare the 
switching behavior of the households that take out a mortgage in t with those that do not, we drop 
from the sample households that already had a mortgage in t-1. Besides the main variable of 
interest, 𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖t , we include the household and bank controls, regional fixed effects, and 
municipality size dummies.64 In the subsample following the reform, we include time dummies to 
capture the economy-wide time fixed effects that may affect the households’ set of opportunities. 
We also control for the intensity of the relationship with the bank, which we proxy for by a dummy 
being 1 if a household uses more than a median number of services with the bank, which is one 
bank service in addition to a bank account. The dummy 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖t−1, thus identifies 
the households that use their bank more intensively and are likely to be more reluctant to switch.65 
                                                          
63 The interest rates reduction started in late 2008. 
64 We do not control for risk aversion, as it is largely missing in 2004 (only a subset of respondents in that wave was 
asked the question), and our pre-reform subsample is already smaller than the post-reform one. This, however, does 
not alter our findings. 
65 Reluctance to switch may be due to time and effort needed to evaluate net gains of switching for each particular 
bank service, but the clients using more services may also enjoy an advantage of economies of scope with the bank, as 
discussed in chapter 2. 
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The results in Table 8 show that, prior to the reform in 2007, taking out a mortgage was not a 
significant factor for a household’s decision to switch its bank, as captured by an insignificant 
coefficient on 𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖t, in columns (1) and (3), whereas “mortgage shopping” became 
widespread thereafter – column (2) and (4). More precisely, the households taking out a mortgage 
after the reform between t-1 and t are about 14% more likely to switch their bank from t-1 than 
clients who do not have a mortgage in either of the two periods.66 Given that the share of switchers 
in our sample ranges from 23-33%, depending on the year, this effect is economically important 
and identifies the “mortgage shopping” as a strong driver of switching following the reform. This 
result is largely in line with Brown and Hoffmann (2013) who document that in Switzerland among 
the households with multiple bank relationships the mortgage relations are typically more recently 
established. Our findings point towards increased bank competition, as a result of a more flexible 
mortgage market that once provided banks with powerful means to retain their clients. The results 
may be also capturing a decrease in the households’ inertia, as they are aware of a much lower 
probability of being locked in an inappropriate deal. It seems very likely that both factors are at 
play, but with the data at hand it is impossible to disentangle which of the two contributed more to 
our results. In sum, our results support the hypothesis that the Bersani Law had a strong impact on 
the dynamics of the household-bank relationship. Our findings are in line with Bennett et al. (2001), 
who argue that, in the US, combination of technological, regulatory, and structural changes made 
mortgage origination more competitive and efficient and the homeowners more financially 
conscious. 
The coefficient on the breadth of the relationship has the expected negative sign, which 
confirms the role of switching costs arising from the cross-selling of services, as shown in chapter 
2, but the effect is precisely estimated only on the post-reform subsample. We further want to 
investigate whether this effect is strong enough to weaken the effect of the “mortgage shopping”; 
thus, in Columns (3) and (4), we re-estimate the model adding the interaction of the two terms: 
𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖t 𝑥 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖t−1 . If a more intensive use of the bank services results 
in sufficiently high switching costs, it should reduce the inclination of such clients to change their 
                                                          
66 To account for the difference in the sample size before the reform compared to after the reform, we perform a Chow 
test for the difference between the two subsamples in the coefficient on our main variable of interest – Add Mortgage. 
The test rejects the null of coefficients equivalence at 5% statistical significance. 
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bank if they plan to take out a mortgage and a better mortgage deal is offered elsewhere. This effect 
would result in a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interacted variable. 
However, the coefficient estimate in column (4) turns out statistically insignificant and positive, 
which highlights the importance of the “mortgage shopping”. Mortgage is one of the most 
important financial decisions households make, because of the long maturity and high debt burden; 
thus, the advantage of a better mortgage deal well outweighs the one-off cost associated with 
switching from a current bank. 
A limitation of our study is that it is unclear to which extent one can assert the external validity 
of the findings. There could be something about the Italian mortgage market(s), or banking market 
as a whole, which makes it unique to the analysis with regard to the refinancing costs. However, to 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature to investigate this topic 
empirically. Future studies can expand countries to verify our findings. Furthermore, the lack of 
more detailed loan level data does not allow us to analyze the mortgage renegotiations with the 
same bank. An interesting empirical question would be to which extent the clients used the 
increased negotiating strength, which the Bersani Law conferred on them, to push their current 
bank to adjust the contracted mortgage terms. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Switching costs can be an important distorter of competition in many markets, including 
banking, and have received significant attention in both academic and policy discussions. However, 
assessing the impact of the switching costs on client and bank behavior imposes a challenge to 
devise a convincing identification strategy. Furthermore, the detailed micro-level data needed for 
such an analysis are very rarely available. Exploiting an exogenous source of variation in mortgage 
refinancing costs brought forward by a legal reform in Italy, known as the Bersani Law, and a 
unique dataset on individual switching behavior of bank retail clients, we are able to address these 
challenges. We study the impact of the reform using a difference-in-differences methodology to 
analyze the switching behavior of clients with mortgages (bank loans directly affected by the 
reform, thus our treated group) and comparable clients without a mortgage (our control group). Our 
analysis identifies the causal effect of the Bersani Law to bank switching of the households with a 
mortgage by cutting high refinancing costs that served as a “lock in” for these clients. Nevertheless, 
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the described “success” of the Bersani Law is confined to the pool of better-educated clients, 
indicating the role of a client sophistication as a determining factor of responsiveness to policy. 
We further document that the reform prompted switching of the mortgage holders only in the less 
competitive environments, which suggests that in such markets the households initially held less 
affordable mortgages. In addition to affecting the switching behavior of extant mortgage holders, 
we also show that the Bersani Law made “mortgage shopping” (switching a bank when taking out 
a mortgage) more widespread. The latter finding indicates that the newly increased flexibility in 
the mortgage market increased bank competition for new clients and decreased clients’ inertia.  
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3.9 Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. All statistics are 
computed at the household level using the sample weights. 
Variables  Obs. Mean Median Min Max St.Dev. 
PANEL A       
Age  2,291 53.87 53 21 90 14.16 
Male  2,291 0.70 1 0 1 0.46 
Married  2,291 0.72 1 0 1 0.45 
Medium education (college) 2,291 0.68 1 0 1 0.47 
High education (>college) 2,291 0.14 0 0 1 0.34 
Household size 2,291 2.69 3 1 8 1.22 
Risk-averse 2,291 0.40 0 0 1 0.49 
Income (€1,000) 2,291 47.12 38.37 0 922.60 48.25 
Net wealth (€1,000)  2,291 389.65 242.50 -875.42 17,878.38 819.40 
Homeowner  2,291 0.75 1 0 1 0.43 
Employee  2,291 0.42 0 0 1 0.49 
Self-employed  2,291 0.18 0 0 1 0.38 
Only one bank used 2,291 0.83 1 0 1 0.38 
Total number of services 
used with the bank 2,291 1.34 1 0 5 0.80 
Commercial Bank 2,291 0.87 1 0 1 0.34 
Cooperative Bank 2,291 0.07 0 0 1 0.25 
Savings Bank 2,291 0.06 0 0 1 0.24 
Return on Assets (ROA) 2,291 0.75 0.8 -1.74 1.27 0.25 
Bank Size (in logs) 2,291 11.41 11.41 9.15 13.72 1.29 
M&A 2,291 0.13 0 0 1 0.33 
PANEL B       
Switch       
Pooled waves (2006-2008) 2,291 0.31 0 0 1 0.46 
2006 365 0.23 0 0 1 0.42 
2008 1,926 0.33 0 0 1 0.47 
Treated (Having a mortgage)       
Pooled waves (2004-2006) 2,291 0.16 0 0 1 0.37 
2004 365 0.13 0 0 1 0.33 
2006 1,926 0.17 0 0 1 0.38 
Add mortgage       
2006 755 0.08 0 0 1 0.27 
2008 1635 0.05 0 0 1 0.22 
2010 1966 0.05 0 0 1 0.21 
2012 1900 0.07 0 0 1 0.26 
 
 
Chapter 3: Till Mortgage Do Us Part: Refinancing Costs and Competition in the Mortgage Market 
110 
 
Figure 1: Timeline 
The line represents time. The notches represent the timing of our observations and the introduction 
of the New Law. 
   Bersani Law, 2007 
 
    2004      2006            2008       2010       2012 
 
            Switch between 2004 and 2006    
            Switch between 2006 and 2008 
            Switch between 2008 and 2010 
               Switch between 2010 and 2012 
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Figure 2: The graph depicts the evolution of switching propensities over the period 
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Table 2: Bersani Law and switching propensity: Comparison of means 
The table displays the switching propensities (mean of the dependent 
variable Switch) between t-1 and t for the control and treated groups, 
before and after the introduction of the Law 40/2007 on February 1st, 
2007. Control refers to the households that did not have a mortgage on 
December 31st of t-1. Treated indicates that the household had a 
mortgage outstanding on the same date. Before refers to switching for 
t=2006 (i.e., switching between 2004 and 2006) and After refers to 
switching for t=2008 (i.e., switching between 2006 and 2008). Standard 
errors are provided in the parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Control Treated Difference 
(Treated-Control) 
Switch    
Before 0.267 0.191 -0.075* 
 (0.016) (0.037) (0.044) 
After 0.34 0.40 0.059** 
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Table 3: Bersani Law and switching 
The table reports the results for regressions of the form: 
yit =α0 +α1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖t−1  +α2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡t +α3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖t−1 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡t) +  Xit−1θ+εit, 
where 𝑖  indexes households, 𝑡  indexes year, and α3  is the difference-in-differences 
estimate corresponding to the coefficient on the interaction term of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 . 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖t−1 indicates the households that reported having a mortgage in t-1. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡t indicates 
the time period after the new legislation became enacted. The dependent variable is Switch, 
being 1 if the household changed his (main) bank between t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise. All 
control variables in vector X  are lagged one period. Robust standard errors in the 
parentheses, clustered at the province level. All regressions are estimated using ordinary 
least squares and the sample weights. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treated -0.094* -0.104* -0.206*** -0.233*** 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.062) (0.069) 
Post 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.046 -0.002 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.039) (0.042) 
Treated x Post 0.151*** 0.156*** 0.246*** 0.255*** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.073) (0.082) 
Medium education    0.074** 0.063* 
    (0.036) (0.036) 
High education    0.060 0.054 
    (0.048) (0.049) 
Household size   0.021 0.018 
    (0.015) (0.014) 
Age   0.004 0.004 
    (0.007) (0.007) 
Age2   -0.003 -0.002 
   (0.007) (0.006) 
Male   -0.065 -0.062 
   (0.045) (0.042) 
Married   -0.068* -0.071** 
   (0.035) (0.031) 
Risk-averse   -0.010 -0.008 
    (0.027) (0.027) 
Homeowner   -0.032 -0.034 
    (0.047) (0.039) 
Employee   0.054* 0.065** 
    (0.032) (0.032) 
Self-employed   0.119*** 0.106** 
   (0.044) (0.047) 
Income – Q2   0.064 0.063 
    (0.056) (0.056) 
Income – Q3   0.040 0.027 
   (0.054) (0.055) 
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Table 3 (continued)     
Income – Q4   -0.008 -0.003 
    (0.055) (0.054) 
Income – Q5   -0.023 -0.025 
    (0.067) (0.069) 
Net Wealth – Q2   -0.064 -0.045 
    (0.052) (0.049) 
Net Wealth – Q3   0.029 0.063 
   (0.061) (0.055) 
Net Wealth – Q4   0.009 0.030 
   (0.055) (0.054) 
Net Wealth – Q5   -0.047 -0.021 
   (0.072) (0.071) 
The only bank used   -0.085** -0.087*** 
    (0.036) (0.032) 
Cooperative Bank    -0.078 
     (0.048) 
Savings Bank    0.032 
     (0.071) 
ROA    0.110 
     (0.084) 
Bank Size (in logs)    0.077*** 
     (0.015) 
M&A    -0.006 
    (0.048) 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls NO YES YES YES 
Observations 2,898 2,898 2,380 2,291 
R-squared 0.013 0.023 0.051 0.100 
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Table 4: Bersani Law and switching: Education split 
The table replicates the results from Table 3 on two subsamples differentiated based on the 
household head’s level of education. Panel A reports the results for a subsample of 
households whose head completed at least secondary school, whereas Panel B reports the 
results for those who did not obtain a secondary-school degree. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL A: Having at least a secondary school degree 
Treated -0.133** -0.141** -0.223*** -0.259*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.065) 
Post 0.077** 0.073** 0.062 0.022 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.045) (0.050) 
Treated x Post 0.169*** 0.173*** 0.257*** 0.269*** 
 (0.060) (0.063) (0.075) (0.086) 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality size controls NO YES YES YES 
Bank characteristics NO NO NO YES  
Household characteristics NO NO YES YES 
Observations 2,279 2,279 1,904 1,832 
R-squared 0.015 0.023 0.055 0.102 
PANEL B: Without a secondary school degree 
Treated 0.309 0.332 0.453* 0.445* 
 (0.213) (0.214) (0.258) (0.240) 
Post 0.057 0.057 -0.032 -0.109 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.087) (0.082) 
Treated x Post -0.175 -0.213 -0.385 -0.328 
 (0.265) (0.258) (0.314) (0.287) 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality size controls NO YES YES YES 
Bank characteristics NO NO NO YES  
Household characteristics NO NO YES YES 
Observations 619 619 476 459 
R-squared 0.014 0.029 0.074 0.152 
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Table 5: Bersani Law and switching: Competition split 
The table replicates the results from Table 3 on two subsamples differentiated based on the 
proxy for competition in the province of the household residence: the Herfindahl index 
computed from the number of ATMs of banks operating in the province. Panel A reports 
the results for a subsample of households in a province with a Herfindahl index higher than 
the median in a given year (i.e., relatively low competition), whereas Panel B reports the 
results for those who reside in a province with a Herfindahl index lower than the median in 
a given year (i.e., relatively high competition). 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL A: Low competition 
Treated -0.119* -0.103* -0.185** -0.224** 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.082) (0.087) 
Post 0.106*** 0.125*** 0.122* 0.077 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.066) (0.062) 
Treated x Post 0.173** 0.159** 0.213** 0.243** 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.095) (0.098) 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality size controls NO YES YES YES 
Bank characteristics NO NO NO YES  
Household characteristics NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,532 1,532 1,280 1,223 
R-squared 0.024 0.051 0.083 0.138 
PANEL B: High competition 
Treated -0.067 -0.080 -0.142 -0.153* 
 (0.080) (0.084) (0.086) (0.085) 
Post 0.037 0.071* 0.020 -0.033 
 (0.057) (0.042) (0.061) (0.067) 
Treated x Post 0.124 0.124 0.166 0.159 
 (0.081) (0.096) (0.103) (0.113) 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality size controls NO YES YES YES 
Bank characteristics NO NO NO YES  
Household characteristics NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,366 1,366 1,100 1,068 
R-squared 0.005 0.046 0.103 0.144 
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Table 6: Robustness: Placebo test 
The table replicates the results from Table 3 using a sample of non-mortgage owners and a 
treatment indicator that singles out households that reported having a consumer and/or personal 
loan. Robust standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the province level. All regressions 
are estimated using ordinary least squares and the sample weights. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treated 0.103 0.097 -0.148 -0.197* 
 (0.192) (0.184) (0.123) (0.102) 
Post 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.053 0.034 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.037) 
Treated x Post -0.225 -0.217 0.018 0.087 
 (0.182) (0.169) (0.082) (0.075) 
Medium education    0.056 0.046 
    (0.038) (0.037) 
High education    0.090 0.106 
    (0.065) (0.067) 
Household size   0.033** 0.032** 
    (0.015) (0.015) 
Age   0.008 0.006 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
Age2   -0.006 -0.003 
   (0.006) (0.005) 
Male   -0.035 -0.032 
   (0.043) (0.044) 
Married   -0.113*** -0.120*** 
   (0.032) (0.032) 
Risk-averse   -0.009 -0.009 
    (0.034) (0.031) 
Homeowner   -0.031 -0.044 
    (0.052) (0.049) 
Employee   0.062 0.063 
    (0.045) (0.043) 
Self-employed   0.153*** 0.147*** 
   (0.047) (0.050) 
Income – Q2   0.064 0.055 
    (0.060) (0.058) 
Income – Q3   0.025 0.011 
   (0.068) (0.067) 
Income – Q4   -0.001 -0.004 
    (0.062) (0.063) 
Income – Q5   -0.015 -0.026 
    (0.070) (0.069) 
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Table 6 (continued)     
Net Wealth – Q2   -0.059 -0.017 
    (0.049) (0.047) 
Net Wealth – Q3   0.039 0.086 
   (0.073) (0.069) 
Net Wealth – Q4   -0.001 0.037 
   (0.069) (0.066) 
Net Wealth – Q5   -0.064 -0.020 
   (0.083) (0.081) 
The only bank used   -0.049 -0.053 
    (0.044) (0.037) 
Cooperative Bank    -0.111** 
     (0.042) 
Savings Bank    0.053 
     (0.071) 
ROA    0.003 
     (0.095) 
Bank Size (in logs)    0.081*** 
     (0.013) 
M&A    0.006 
    (0.061) 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls NO YES YES YES 
Observations 3,263 3,263 2,385 2,299 
R-squared 0.009 0.022 0.053 0.103 
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Table 7: Robustness: Fixed effects estimation 
The table reports the results for regressions of the form: 
yit =αi +Υt +β(𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝i × 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭t) + 𝐗it−1θ+εit, 
where 𝑖  indexes households, 𝑡  indexes the year, andβ is the difference-in-differences 
estimate corresponding to the coefficient on the interaction term of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 indicates the households that in the panel always reported having a mortgage. 
We drop the households that take out a mortgage in t or pay it off between t-1 and t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡t 
indicates the time period after the new legislation became enacted. The dependent variable 
is Switch, being 1 if the household changed its (main) bank between t-1 and t, and 0 
otherwise. All control variables in vector X are lagged one period. Robust standard errors 
in the parentheses, clustered at the household level. All regressions are estimated using 
fixed effects model. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Panel A reports the results for the full sample, whereas Panels B 
and C report the results for the two subsamples differentiated based on the proxy for 
competition in the province of the household residence. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL A: Full sample 
Treated x Post 0.056 0.060 0.178* 0.198** 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.096) (0.101) 
T2008 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.101*** 0.096** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038) 
T2010 -0.035 -0.040 -0.027 -0.026 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.044) (0.044) 
T2012 -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.078 -0.094* 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.055) (0.056) 
Observations 2,070 2,061 1,739 1,696 
Number of households 770 768 732 719 
R-squared 0.028 0.030 0.056 0.083 
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Table 7 (continued)     
PANEL B: Low competition 
Treated x Post 0.135 0.141 0.304** 0.317** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.141) (0.137) 
T2008 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.141** 0.147** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.061) 
T2010 0.000 -0.006 0.052 0.064 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.069) (0.070) 
T2012 -0.012 -0.022 0.056 0.049 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.091) (0.090) 
Observations 1,171 1,171 1,006 982 
Number of households 584 584 538 531 
R-squared  0.032 0.037 0.082 0.099 
PANEL C: High competition     
Treated x Post -0.047 -0.046 0.002 0.107 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.250) (0.257) 
T2008 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.213*** 0.187*** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.073) (0.069) 
T2010 0.003 0.002 0.093 0.088 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.086) (0.074) 
T2012 -0.095* -0.096* -0.003 -0.030 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.096) (0.075) 
Observations 878 878 721 702 
Number of households 457 457 415 403 
R-squared  0.046 0.046 0.126 0.186 
Bank controls NO NO NO YES 
Household controls NO NO YES YES 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls NO YES YES YES 
 
  
Chapter 3: Till Mortgage Do Us Part: Refinancing Costs and Competition in the Mortgage Market 
121 
 
Figure 3: Interest rates trend 
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Table 8: Bersani Law and new mortgages 
The table reports the results for regressions of the form: 
yit =β0 +β1𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖t +β2𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖t−1 +                    
β3𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖t 𝑥 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖t−1 +  Xit−1θ+εit, 
where 𝑖  indexes households and 𝑡  indexes the year. 𝐴𝑑𝑑_𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖t indicates the 
households that did not hold a mortgage with their (main) bank in t-1 and they take out a 
mortgage in t. 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖t−1  is a dummy being 1 if in t-1 a household uses more 
than one bank service in addition to a bank account. We drop the households that already 
had a mortgage in t-1. All control variables in vector X  are lagged one period. In all 
regressions, we control for the full set of household characteristics (household size, 
homeownership, income, wealth, household head’s employment status, age, gender, marital 
status, education, risk-aversion, and exclusivity of the household’s relationship with the 
bank). Robust standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the province level. All 
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares and the sample weights. The sample 
is split with regard to the introduction of the Bersani Law on 1 February 2007. The symbols 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variables 2004-2006 2008-2012 2004-2006 2008-2012 
Add Mortgage 0.051 0.145*** 0.091 0.129*** 
 (0.064) (0.039) (0.073) (0.036) 
Broad Relationship -0.057 -0.047** -0.038 -0.052** 
 (0.046) (0.022) (0.048) (0.023) 
Add Mortgage x Broad Relationship   -0.190 0.076 
   (0.129) (0.102) 
T2010  -0.112***  -0.113*** 
  (0.030)  (0.030) 
T2012  -0.121***  -0.121*** 
  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Macro_Regions controls YES YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,490 5,596 1,490 5,596 
R-squared 0.074 0.046 0.076 0.047 
  
 









Dependent variable  
Switch  
Binary variable taking value 1 if between t-1 and t a household 




Binary variable taking value 1 if a household has a mortgage still 
outstanding with its (main) bank, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Post 
Binary variable taking value 1 if the year of observation falls after 
the Law 40/2007 was introduced in 2007. 
SHIW 
Add mortgage 
Binary variable taking value 1 if a household does not have a 
mortgage with the (main) bank in wave t-1, but has a mortgage in 




Binary variable taking value 1 if a household uses more than 1 bank 
service (in addition to a bank account), and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
Age, Age2 
Integer variables representing the age of the household head and its 
quadratic form.  
SHIW 
Male 




Binary variable taking value 1 if the household head is married, and 




High Education  
Binary variables taking value 1 for the corresponding level of 
education: Medium education corresponds to having completed 
secondary school and/or college; High education corresponds to 
having obtained a graduate and/or post-graduate degree. The 
reference category is Low education, i.e., having completed only 
primary education or having no education at all. 
SHIW 
Household size Categorical variable counting the number of household members. SHIW 
Risk-averse 
Binary variable taking value 1 if risk aversion level is 4, 0 
otherwise. The risk-aversion level is obtained by means of a 
categorical variable representing the preferred risk profile of 
financial investments: 
1 = High risk, high returns; 2 = Reasonable risk, good returns 





Binary variables taking value 1 if the household’s yearly disposable 
income (net wealth, defined as the sum of real and financial assets, 




Binary variable taking value 1 if a household owns its primary 
residence, and 0 otherwise. 
SHIW 
 









Binary variables taking value 1 for household heads being in the 
corresponding occupational status, 0 otherwise. Reference category 
is “non-working position”.  
SHIW 
The only bank 
used 






Binary variables taking value 1 for the corresponding bank’s 




Variable representing the ratio between the bank’s pre-tax profits 
and assets, in percentage points. 
BS 
Size  Bank's total assets, in logs.  BS 
M&A 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the bank underwent a process of 




Dummy variables taking value 1 in the relevant year, and 0 




Dummy variables taking value 1 for the relevant macro-region 
(North-West, Centre, South), and 0 otherwise. The reference 




Categorical variable representing the size of the residential 
municipality: 
1 = less than 5,000; 2 = [5,000-20,000]; 3 = [20,000-50,000]; 
4 = [50,000-200,000]; 5 = more than 200,000 
The model specifications include four dummies for municipality 
size from 2 to 5, i.e., the reference category is 1 (municipality size 




Normalized Herfindahl index of banks’ ATM points in the province 
of the household residence, ranging between 0 (perfect 
competition) and 1 (monopoly). 
BI 
Note: SHIW is Survey on Household Income and Wealth; BS is Bankscope; BI is Bank of Italy.
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Table A2: Bersani Law and switching 
The table reports the results for regressions of the form: 
yit =α0 +α1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖t  +α2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡t +α3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖t × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡t) +  Xit−1θ+
εit, 
where 𝑖  indexes households, 𝑡  indexes year, and α3  is difference-in-differences 
estimate corresponding to the coefficient on the interaction term of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  and 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖t indicates the households that reported having a mortgage both in t-
1 and in t. The control group consists of all households that reported not having a 
mortgage in either t-1 nor in t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡t indicates the time period after the new legislation 
was introduced. The dependent variable is Switch, being 1 if the household changed 
its (main) bank between t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise. All control variables in vector X 
are lagged one period. Robust standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the 
province level. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares and the 
sample weights. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treated -0.091 -0.113 -0.217*** -0.244*** 
 (0.083) (0.077) (0.068) (0.075) 
Post 0.078** 0.071** 0.050 0.002 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.039) (0.041) 
Treated x Post 0.108 0.119 0.214** 0.221** 
 (0.094) (0.090) (0.094) (0.105) 
Medium education    0.068* 0.061 
    (0.039) (0.038) 
High education    0.030 0.036 
    (0.054) (0.055) 
Household size   0.033** 0.030** 
    (0.015) (0.014) 
Age   0.005 0.004 
    (0.007) (0.007) 
Age2   -0.003 -0.002 
   (0.007) (0.006) 
Male   -0.064 -0.061 
   (0.042) (0.042) 
Married   -0.103*** -0.102*** 
   (0.037) (0.033) 
Risk-averse   0.002 -0.000 
    (0.028) (0.028) 
Homeowner   -0.023 -0.029 
    (0.056) (0.051) 
Employee   0.043 0.050 
    (0.033) (0.033) 
Self-employed   0.132** 0.109** 
   (0.051) (0.053) 
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Table A2 (continued)     
Income – Q2   0.086* 0.079 
    (0.051) (0.050) 
Income – Q3   0.074 0.050 
   (0.056) (0.057) 
Income – Q4   0.017 0.015 
    (0.057) (0.055) 
Income – Q5   0.002 -0.014 
    (0.067) (0.069) 
Net Wealth – Q2   -0.070 -0.040 
    (0.055) (0.054) 
Net Wealth – Q3   0.010 0.049 
   (0.068) (0.064) 
Net Wealth – Q4   -0.017 0.016 
   (0.058) (0.058) 
Net Wealth – Q5   -0.062 -0.023 
   (0.069) (0.068) 
The only bank used   -0.080* -0.072** 
    (0.041) (0.034) 
Cooperative Bank    -0.086** 
     (0.041) 
Savings Bank    0.011 
     (0.067) 
ROA    0.130* 
     (0.068) 
Bank Size (in logs)    0.073*** 
     (0.015) 
M&A    -0.030 
    (0.050) 
Macro_Regions controls NO YES YES YES 
Municipality Size controls NO YES YES YES 
Observations 2,545 2,545 2,089 2,015 
R-squared 0.010 0.023 0.057 0.104 
 
 
 
 
